

UNITED STATES ARMY
COMBAT FORCES

Journal

Infantry Journal

Field Artillery Journal

JULY 1953
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This sensible, thoughtful editorial, so typical of Colonel Greene's thinking and writing, was found in his desk after his death. It was in longhand on small sheets of note paper and was probably written on a train trip in 1949, a year before Infantry Journal and The Field Artillery Journal were merged. It doesn't appear to be finished and Colonel Greene must have intended to add to it. In any event we know our readers will agree that it is still timely and deserves publication. The answer to the question of why it wasn't published when written is that Colonel Greene was so busy that he sometimes wrote editorials in spare moments and then would mislay or forget them.

WHAT MORE CAN WE LEARN ABOUT LEADING?

COLONEL JOSEPH I. GREENE

IN its forty-five years of publication this JOURNAL has printed hundreds of articles on what makes a great leader and on how to lead men. It is the big subject always. The big subject for war and peace.

The Army has always paid some official attention to leadership, but never so much as in World War II and since. The postwar years especially have seen much emphasis on this great and central military topic—with a good deal of dressing it up under fancier names, like "personnel management," "career guidance" and the like. And along with the greater attention to leadership under several different names, there has arisen, we think, a considerable amount of resistance to it—more from men of combat experience, we would guess, than from others.

What more is there to learn about leading men? Why get into all this fancy business of psychology and management? War brings out the successful leaders. The last war brought out plenty of them. Just use the good old methods those men used. There isn't much you can learn about it from anyone else. Why drag in all this stuff about handling men in industry? We've got plenty of men who have handled troops in battle.

There is a certain amount of sense in such thoughts. "Personnel management" is a cold, unhuman sounding expression. It is a standard editorial practice here at the *Infantry Journal* to cross out the word "personnel" and replace it with "men" or "soldiers" whenever possible. There are times when "personnel" is the correct word. But often it's used incorrectly as a too formal word for flesh and blood fighting men.

So the *Journal* makes this correction whenever we need to.

"Management" is also a cold-sounding word. There is the objection in it that no good man wants to be "managed." It's true that when you manage a business, an industry or an army, you must also manage the men who are part of it. But just the same there's a feeling about the word "management" which includes some sense of putting something over on the people who get managed. The word has an honest and legitimate meaning, but when you join it to "personnel" in "personnel management" it has a push-button, automatic sound. The manager does this or that—to make his men (excuse us, his "personnel") do that or this. Each thing he does, whether coldly or kindly, sternly or gently, is a calculated act. He does things to get results. He does them only to get results. He does nothing except those things intended to get results. He is an expert at "management" and what he manages is "personnel."

WHEN it all gets written out in textbooks and manuals, it often seems as if you never manage personnel because you like to deal with men, like to help them, like to build a human team—a team that does things because you see the need for doing them and the team does too.

Actually this idea of warm human relationships is the idea on which all personnel management must be founded. Otherwise, it is empty nonsense. And the trouble is that experts in the "theory" of the management of men seldom know how to put warmth in their words—may even get to feeling that they know all the answers. And thinking that leader-

ship is actually a cold science, possible to spell out in rules, tables and formulas.

You can't blame a tested combat leader for wanting to brush off "personnel management" when he runs into signs that it knows much better than he does. But he can be wrong, too.

He wouldn't be wrong about it if he could tell you exactly how he has led men so successfully in the heavy strain of combat.

If he is a good clear talker or writer and not too mistakenly modest, he can tell you many things he did. And those will be helpful to others who may have to act some day in similar circumstances. He may have some simple rules about how to treat troops. And those are likely to be sound and helpful for other leaders, too, though not always—because what one leader does is not always the best way for another. For example, the quiet serious leader cannot make himself into a jolly loud-voiced man, no matter how hard he tries.

One leader, like General Patton, may believe as that General once wrote—that the commander must constantly be an actor. But it takes a lot of practice to become a good, convincing actor. And acting that looks like acting and is recognized as such is worse than no acting. The actor general had better be good at it—or have something human and solid for men to recognize the moment they see through his make-up and his part playing.

Yes, if the able experienced leader could tell you why he is good, and tell it plainly enough for others to readily learn, there might not be any need for a science of leadership. What such men said and wrote would be the science.

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
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"MODERN MINUTE MAN."	Seventh place honors in All-Army photo-	
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New Observation Plane Uses Almost No Oil, Eases Supply Problem In Combat Areas.

News that the world's first turbine-powered light airplane, Cessna Aircraft Company's XL-19B, can operate efficiently on all grades and ranges of fuel, was announced recently by spokesmen at the firm's Wichita plant.

The new development is of special significance to combat supply and maintenance personnel who face the difficult and dangerous problem of maintaining large inventories of vehicle and aircraft fuels near front-line areas.


Other military advantages of the XL-19B turbine engine are low oil consumption, easy installation and maintenance, and almost complete elimination of in-flight cooling and vibration problems.

In addition to developing the turboprop light plane, Cessna engineers are currently experimenting on a new helicopter, producing L-19 observation planes for the Army, Marines and National Guard, building assemblies for jet fighter and bomber planes and conducting tests on Boundary Layer Control which shortens the landing and take-off runs of high-speed aircraft.

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★ To the Editors . . . ★

Importance of Being Average

To the Editors:

Various JOURNAL articles and letters "To the Editors" concerning Army efficiency reports bring to mind the thoughts of my troop commander of some twenty years ago, on the "importance of being average." His ideas were:

(1) Army officers fall into three general groups of "poor, average, and above average," based upon a combination of their individual mental capabilities and personal interest in the Service;

(2) Poor officers consistently receive only "average or low" efficiency ratings and eventually are eliminated through "B" board action;

(3) Average officers normally are selected for assignment only to routine duties which they discharge with "superior efficiency" by following the book, particularly in regard to their paper work which provides the permanent records of performance [incident to which the Captain commented that nothing insures poor efficiency ratings more effectively than poor paper work sent to higher authority];

(4) Only above average officers normally are detailed to the new and/or dif-

ficult projects requiring the individual to blaze a trail; but, since being right seven times out of ten is a high average, even the best qualified officer must face the fact that his trail blazing failures, few though they be, will be remembered in his efficiency report record long after the original circumstances are forgotten.

Observation and experience of many years make me agree with my captain's ideas in many respects, and to agree with many others that the then and the current efficiency reports are too far from perfect to receive the weight they do. Perhaps an equitable solution to the efficiency report problem would be for the individual to rate himself first and such rating then be re-rated by his peers.

LT. COL. HORSEMASTER

Solutions

To the Editors:

I have read a great deal recently about the low morale and discipline of the army which is resulting in many Regular enlisted men resigning, and although different regulations make it less noticeable, the same factors affect officers.

I should like to offer a solution which

I feel is worthy of consideration and with modifications, better known to the high command, might get us out of the woods. I'll list the attempted solutions and show how I feel they might be modified to secure better results.

Recently the Infantry has been fancying up its uniform. I think the problem of uniform is long past mending, but not just for the Infantry. The rest of us could stand to look a little snappier. Why not have an Army-wide design contest among the men and a board of fashion experts select the best one? This of course applies only to dress. Other types are best designed by the services.

My solution to promotions is to make a temporary promotion exactly that for both officers and men. If an enlisted man or officer fills a TO above his rank, his commanding officer by assigning him automatically promotes him to that position. Loss of assignment means a return to regular rank. The Navy has recently stated "Par for the course of 30 years service is Captain." I think perhaps we have need of established pars in the Army, and that we should make some attempt to keep an officer's or an enlisted man's age or length of service in line with his rank. Judging by the number of lieutenant colonels age 33 to 37 and master sergeants age 27 to 33 in the Army today, I wouldn't be surprised to find us adopting a Chinese idea and forming officer combat regiments to take care of the extra chiefs.

Morale and discipline can be handled by returning to an old custom. Put the soldier in a unit and keep him there for his military life. Rotate units, not individuals. There is hardly any power on earth that can make a man devoted to his unit just after he has been assigned to it and when he knows damn well it's just a way station to the next one. Morale is dependent on a sense of belonging. None of us has it any more. We are the largest group of insecure American men and women in existence. Since we have two choices of retirement for enlisted men, let's give them an option of combat pay or extra time toward a 30 years' retirement, for different overseas assignments. It might even help buck up the Mrs.' morale to know that she will have a longer retired life with me to look forward to because of the present separation.

Last but not least, develop a service-wide "suggestion box" where the ideas of the millions of men and women in service can be accepted, sorted, weighed and channeled into a headquarters which will act as an efficiency agency similar to those employed by major industries. This would, I feel, serve a twofold purpose: first, it would make use of many valid ideas which are not finding an outlet in our present

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
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Rommel Fan

To the Editors:

I am a fan of the late Field Marshal Erwin Rommel. As a fan, I greedily read Brigadier Desmond Young's *The Desert Fox*, but it served only as an hors d'oeuvre for what promised to be military knowledge of banquet proportions.

Brigadier Young referred several times to a book Rommel wrote in 1937 on his World War I experiences as an infantry commander called *Infanterie Greift an*. This book was translated under the title of *Infantry Attacks* and printed by Infantry Journal Press in 1944. I made an effort to acquire this book from your Book Service but was told that it was out of print and unobtainable.

I recently came across one copy of this book in our Camp Pendleton library and through a kind librarian was able to take it out and read it.

The book impressed me tremendously and I feel that all students of small-unit tactics, battalion and below, would enjoy it as much as I. The problem is how to create a demand for the book that would make it profitable for you to reprint it.

With an eye toward this, I thought that the publishing of portions of this letter in your magazine might bring forth sufficient response from your readers to impress the publishers.

I plan on writing a letter similar to this one to the *Marine Corps Gazette* in the hope that it will appeal to a still wider range of prospective Rommel readers.

Incidentally, I instruct the students at our NCO school to read your magazine in order to advance their professional knowledge. Admittedly, I warn them not to forget the traditional "grain of salt" when so doing, however.

Lt. ROBERT G. HUNT, JR.
USMC

NCO School
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Camp Pendleton, Cal.

Promotion and Command

To the Editors:

The tribulations of many an officer concerning his promotion(s) can easily be solved. Here are two possible solutions.

Change first the method of selection. Let's consider junior officers each quarter year and field grade officers twice per annum. This will allow the Department of the Army sufficient time to prepare a roster of officers who are eligible for the next higher rank. The rosters should then be forwarded to field commanders for their recommendations.

Promotions up to and including the rank

A Salute

TO THE LOW-FLYING MEN!



All hail to the ace in the "wild blue yonder" . . . but let's give with some man-sized cheers for the lads who slug it out at hill-top level. From the time

they take off . . . till the mission is completed, these strategic fighter bombers and tactical close support pilots face a brutal blasting all along the way.

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of captain should be concurred in by the incumbent's superior officers. Where there is a slightest doubt that the officer is qualified for promotion at the particular time he should be told why. At the same time he should be given an opportunity to better himself. Transfer him to another organization where he can serve under a different commander. At least three such opportunities should be afforded each junior officer. If he then doesn't show enough improvement weed him out of the Army.

Promotion to the rank of field grade should follow the same pattern. The Department of the Army should forward rosters of eligible officers (age and time in grade, in that order, should be considered), to field commanders. These in turn should appoint boards of officers, one for each camp, post, area or a divisional size unit, whose mission would be to interview them as to qualification and make recommendations. The final selection for promotion on all field grade promotions should be made on the Department of the Army level.

The members of these boards should be made up on a percentage basis, 80 per cent reserves and 20 per cent regulars, or whatever is the percentage of reserves/regulars in the particular activity the board meets. Age of the eligible officer concerned should be the number one factor to be considered. Because with age goes experience, the know-how, and that something a young officer just simply doesn't possess.

Under the above solution many an officer who is a hard and efficient worker today stands a good chance to be promoted because he knows his immediate superior will have a say on it. Conversely, many an officer who may have been a good worker and received good efficiency reports up to yesterday but who is not worth a damn today, will not get promoted. What is more important, he will be told why.

The second solution is radical, but could easily be adopted. The problem of promotion exists primarily in the field grades where there just aren't enough ranks to go around. Some people feel slighted and many have a morbid fear they will never get any higher. Why not then de-evaluate the responsibility the field ranks have held heretofore? Why not make majors command companies, colonels command battalions and brigadier generals command regiments?

Lieutenant colonels should be the second-in-command of battalions and regiments, or their executives.

A company today is not only worth in dollars what a battalion was yesterday, but it has practically the same responsibilities a battalion had in prewar days. This rule applies equally well to battalions and regiments.

One of the biggest and greatest problems we have in the army today is lack of leadership among junior officers. And yet it is these same officers who command the most important units from the disciplinary and moral point of view. At the most, companies today are commanded by first lieutenants, very seldom by captains. To say that all junior officers lack the knowledge and application of leadership would be unfair to some who are excellent leaders.

Under this solution most officers could expect to reach colonel, at least, and many would get the star they dream of.

MAJOR FRANK NOVAK

7781 SCU (PM)

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Wavell Letters

To the Editors:

I am engaged in sorting out the papers of my father, the late Field Marshal Earl Wavell, and I am most anxious to collect all possible material about him before people's memories fade.

I would be most grateful for the loan of any letters or an account of any personal incidents, meetings, or conversations with my father, which any of our readers will be kind enough to send to me.

No early publication is in view, but I wish to collect material for an eventual biographer.

MAJOR THE EARL WAVELL

51 South Street

London, W. 1.

One Bad Report

To the Editors:

In a recent issue of the COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL, I read several gripes on the injustices of the promotion system. This is not a gripe, but I would like to show up the injustice which is done to officers of one service when they serve under senior officers from a sister service.

I am an infantry officer who commanded a regiment in World War II and received the DSC, and other decorations. I was among the first to attend the National War College. I served in the Pentagon where I received superior ratings and two letters of commendations. It was because of this work that I was selected to be an Army member of a joint staff which was being organized overseas.

Shortly after the staff was organized my group was placed under an Air Force general who took a very dim view of intelligence activities. Although he was not enthusiastic about officers who were in G2, he gave me the impression that I was doing a superior job. When I returned to the ZI two years later and saw my efficiency reports, I found that I had been damned with faint praise. It is interesting to note that since I have returned to work for senior Army officers, my reports have returned to their former high level.

The injustice, as I see it, is that a senior officer from a sister service can ruin an officer, not because the officer was inefficient, but because a senior officer in a sister service so judges him. Isn't there some factor which can be applied in cases like this so that an officer won't lose a chance for promotion?

COL. SCARRED HEART

COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL



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JOSEPH I. GREENE, SOLDIER

COLONEl JOSEPH INGHAM GREENE, Infantry-retired, suffered a heart attack and died in Newark, New Jersey, on the evening of 25 June 1953. He had been editor of **COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL** and Secretary-General Manager of the Association of the United States Army since their organization in 1950. He was editor of *Infantry Journal* and Secretary-General Manager of the U.S. Infantry Association from 1940 to 1950, and Associate Editor of *Infantry Journal* from 1938 to 1940.

Colonel Greene enlisted in the Army on 8 May 1918 and served as Private, Private First Class and Corporal in the 48th, 89th and 46th Infantry regiments until 13 June 1919 when he entered the Military Academy, from which he graduated in 1923. He was a graduate of the Infantry School and the Command and General Staff College. He retired in 1945 but continued on active duty until 1946. He held the Legion of Merit.

Funeral services were held at Fort Myer Chapel, 29 June 1953, with the former Chief of Chaplains, Major General Luther Miller, Retired, conducting the services. The grave is on a steep slope of Arlington cemetery overlooking the Pentagon Building.

FOR too many years Colonel Greene carried too heavy a load and tried to do more things than can be done in a twenty-four-hour day, seven-day week, or twelve-month year. Time was the one implacable enemy of this gentlemanly, warm-hearted, friendly man. In sickness and in health (and for many years he suffered from far more than any reasonable number of aches and pains), he fought against its tyranny. The unfinished work that was piled high on his desk during those years was a symbol of this battle and a mark of his refusal to face up to the fact that there wasn't time to do all of the things his sense of duty demanded of him, his standards of friendship required of him, his generous nature imposed upon him. His spirit would never admit there wasn't time to do all the things the world asked of this talented man.

His spirit never failed him, but finally his heart did—that big, friendly, generous, grievously overburdened heart gave out and the battle against time was over.

But the battle wasn't lost. In the words of Horace (*Non omnis moriar*), Joe Greene will not all die. For this magazine and its association stand today as his monument. He was the COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL and the COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL was Joe Greene. It was so much a part of him that the separation by death is a greater wrench than any man can know. Whatever the JOURNAL may become—and he could see no limits to its potentialities for service—a part of it died with him. But a part of Joe Greene will always remain in this magazine. It is impossible not to believe that.

Colonel Greene was a great editor; make no mistake about that! He put his own wide and wonderful talents to the fullest possible service of his magazine, his army, and his native land. He mixed high idealism with common sense and hard work. His intelligence was keen and perceptive, his judgment incisive and good. He was quick to praise and his criticism was invariably constructive and kind.

During Colonel Greene's long editorship the JOURNAL received high marks from private soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers of all ranks. It was also highly respected by civilian readers and received the praise of other editors, authors and journalists. That these professionals know that a magazine is largely the product of its directing editor, testifies to the greatness of Colonel Greene as an editor.

It would be impossible accurately to weigh the influence for good that Colonel Greene exerted on the Army through his editorship. Many of his most valuable contributions were hidden in the anonymity of the editor-author relationship. But it can be said that Colonel Greene did much to make the Army conscious of the power of the written word and to realize that both the accomplishments and the failures of the Army of a free country are legitimate public interests.

HE was quick to recognize talent, even in the rough, and he was generous with time-consuming encouragement and criticism of young and old writers alike. In the years before books and the business problems took so much of his time, he would search for young Army writers of promise and work with them until they developed into first-class writing talent.

There was Brigadier General Paul W. Thompson, now in charge of the French edition of *The Reader's Digest*. He was Captain Thompson on duty in the Office of the Chief of Engineers when Colonel Greene, then new to the editorship of *Infantry Journal*, found him and gave him the opportunity to develop into a first-class writer.

The case of Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall was a bit different. Marshall was a veteran newspaperman who had given years to the study of war when Colonel Greene was introduced to him by reading and reviewing *Blitzkrieg* and *Armies on Wheels*, books Marshall had published back in 1940 and 1941. In *Infantry Journal* Colonel Greene hailed the author as "a military expert of the first class." General Marshall's subsequent career as a military historian bore out this acclaim and it is to Colonel Greene's credit that many of S. L. A. Marshall's important battlefield discoveries were given to the Army for the first time in the columns of this magazine.

He never completely lost touch with young writers of promise—as many in the Army today can testify—but it was a constant source of regret to him that he didn't have more time for this.

Colonel Greene was a superb copy editor. He could swiftly and surely transform a crudely written, badly or-

ganized manuscript into clear, sensible prose by clarifying with a simpler word or phrase here and there, and by re-writing and re-arranging with a deft, certain pen (instead of a pencil he used a pen with a very fine point that maddened typists until they became familiar with his handwriting). He was so skillful an editor that occasionally articles lost their original style and flavor and partook of the style and flavor of the editor. In most cases this was a distinct gain, but once in a rare while it unfortunately resulted in the loss of the flavor of a rough and ready writer.

As a stylist he was contemporary, holding that the purpose of writing was to tell the reader something in words that could not be misunderstood. So he preferred the simple word to the complex, the Anglo-Saxon word to the Latin, the active verb to the passive.

These stylistic standards were largely responsible for the JOURNAL's readability and liveliness, and in the days when Colonel Greene had little time for JOURNAL copy editing he would remind his subordinate editors of the need for simple and clear writing and careful editing. The little article by Colonel Greene on the inside front cover of this issue is a wonderful example of the kind of writing he wanted in the magazine.

IN the master index of articles and authors of *Infantry Journal* there are thirty-five cards under Colonel Greene's name and these list a total of 322 articles he wrote for it between 1929 and 1950. In the COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL index there are seven cards with 64 entries. His first article in the *Infantry Journal* appeared in September 1929 and was a study of the dispersion of machine-gun fire when used against aircraft. Through the years his subject-matter reflected first the changing attitudes, requirements and problems of the Army, and secondly his own changing interests. For many years he wrote more book reviews than anything else and this reflected his love of books, his passionate belief that more soldiers should read more books. And write them, too. He once told one of his subordinate editors that books written by military men should be criticized gently in the JOURNAL if they were bad and praised if at all possible. "We must encourage soldiers to write and they won't if they are too sharply criticized in their own service magazines," he said. And at another time he observed that non-professional writers are much more sensitive to criticism than the professionals, who know criticism is part of the business.

Colonel Greene would have no objections if we reveal here that the initials "G.V." that appeared on so many book reviews in the past fifteen years were his pseudonym. He used them, not so much to hide his identity (many of his intimates were aware of it), as because he believed it was unwise for the name of the editor to appear too often. How he came to choose "G.V." isn't remembered now, but it tickled his fancy; "G.V." stood for Giuseppe Verdi—which is Italian for Joseph Greene.

His love of books and bookmaking led him to his great wartime work in publishing paper-backed "Fighting Forces" books. This was an accomplishment of great magnitude and a distinct service to his country. It was performed under extremely difficult conditions. Colonel Greene not only had to select the books he wanted to publish and obtain the rights from authors and publishers who sometimes were slow to understand his program, but he also had to persuade the services of the benefits that would be derived from making it possible for good military and semi-military books to

be widely distributed in all theaters of war. And he had also to fight for supplies during the years of shortages.

Among Colonel Greene's major interests was the study of military history. His competence as a historian was recognized by long service as a member of the Board of Trustees of the American Military Institute, of which he was also President for several years. It was therefore with full realization of the value of recording American campaigns that after the war he encouraged the publishing of unit histories.

The unit histories published by the Infantry Journal Press are by any standard superior specimens of their kind. This can be attributed directly to Colonel Greene. He was lavish in the assistance and counsel he gave the writers and editors of these books and he was insistent that the books be well done. A few of them are masterpieces of bookmaking and all of them are excellent.

It was during these early postwar years that he became interested in the overseas library and publishing problems of the Government. He extended his assistance to the Civil Affairs Division of the General Staff and embarked on an ambitious program of selecting American books for publication in the occupied countries. When occupation responsibilities were transferred from the Army to the State Department, Colonel Greene was called upon to continue this work. He believed passionately in the rightness and urgency of the work he did on our overseas information programs and he was proud that the Association was able to participate in them. He understood that the first battle we had to win was the battle for the minds of our allies and of the neutrals; that we had to make them see us as we are instead of as they imagine we are or wish we were, or as our enemies say we are. To the extent that we could win this battle, the task of our fighting forces in some future battles might be lighter, and Joe Greene fought for it with all of his strength.

He had a large circle of friends and acquaintances in the book world, where he was honored, respected and loved. He served on the Council on Books in Wartime and with other book-industry groups and committees. In these contacts he was a constant advocate of better understanding of the Army. In Colonel Greene the military services had the best possible ambassador to the Republic of Letters.

COLONEL GREENE almost single-handedly conceived, planned, cajoled and persuaded until the support and the backing, and the belief in the wisdom of a single association and magazine for the fighting arms of the Army took hold and became a reality. Many other men helped, but it was Colonel Greene who stayed by it and followed through during the years the idea was developing. Members of his staff can vividly recall the suppressed excitement and pleasure in his voice as he told them that General Jacob L. Devers, then Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, had told him he believed in and favored a single combat arms association and magazine. In the years that followed, Colonel Greene was always quick to credit General Devers for his early support and encouragement, but we believe that General Devers himself would say that Joe Greene was the commander as well as the operations officer in the campaign for an Association of the U.S. Army and a COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL. When the time came to establish them, he received the help of many infantrymen and artillerymen, including, as Colonel Greene always remembered, the selfless service of Colonel Breckinridge Day, the then Secretary and Editor of the Field Artillery Association and *Journal*.

The concept of a common association developed slowly in him. One colleague, looking back after Colonel Greene's death, could see that it had had an uphill battle in its formative years. Partly for the same reasons that every soldier develops branch pride and loyalty, but emphasized because his position as editor of *Infantry Journal* made him the spokesman and advocate of the infantry, Colonel Greene first developed his unity theme by proposing the unification of the Army around the infantry. The first public soundings on the theme from his pen, so far as can be remembered, came in 1941 when for the August issue he wrote an editorial on "The Infantry Mind." The title was obviously picked up from those critics who mistakenly and ignorantly use the word infantry as a synonym for reactionary fuddy-duddies. In this editorial Colonel Greene turned the tables on them.

"The Infantry mind," he wrote, "is a mind that thinks men are the essence of fighting power . . . every fighting man and every man who helps him fight."

"The Infantry mind," he continued, "is a mind that wants every weapon and gadget . . . adopted that will add strength and power and speed and sureness to the whole fighting force."

And finally: "The Infantry mind, so the Infantryman thinks, must be the same mind as the Air Force mind, the Armored Force mind, the Quartermaster mind, the Field Artillery mind, the Ordnance mind, the Coast Artillery mind, the Finance mind, the Cavalry mind, the Chemical Warfare mind, the Signal Corps mind, the Engineer mind, the Medical Corps mind, the Morale Branch mind, and the minds of Chaplains and Inspectors and Adjutants General. One mind there must be—one single mind, with one single, hard-driving aim—the defeat, the crushing defeat, of the enemy."

This was one of the finest editorials Colonel Greene ever wrote and it deserves to be remembered.

COLONEL GREENE had a bump of curiosity that dug into all manner of things and he possessed the kind of intelligence that ranged beyond the conventional and into the outer reaches where new ideas and new thinking lurk unseen and uncomprehended by less perceptive minds.

He was an accomplished amateur mathematician, surely unusual among editors! Back in the Benning days he and Brigadier General Leonard R. Boyd, retired, then a major, invented an antiaircraft machine-gun sight. He became an excellent lay psychologist, respected and honored by the professionals. His editorship of *Psychology for the Armed Services* gave him a wide acquaintanceship among psychologists and the close friendship of Dr. Edwin G. Boring of Harvard. His interest in psychology was not extracurricular and apart from his work as an editor or his duty as a soldier. He turned to it in search of knowledge that could be used to improve the leadership of combat commanders.

Colonel Greene was a better editorial craftsman than he was a writer. This he might dispute for he took pride in his best writing. And his best stuff was indeed top drawer. But that bedeviled tyrant time interfered too often with careful writing. Probably few of his acquaintances knew that he occasionally wrote poetry and had published at least one short story. He edited the *Infantry Journal Reader*, published in 1942 by Doubleday and Company, as a labor of love and pride in the magazine he was editing. He wrote a wartime "quickie"—*What You Should Know About the Army Ground Forces*—that was far sounder than most such

books. He was the co-editor and compiler of four fine anthologies: *First Love, Husbands and Lovers, Stories for Here and Now*, and *Stories of Sudden Truth*.

He loved the company of poets and they loved him. During the war years in Washington when arthritis troubled him greatly he thoroughly enjoyed Sunday morning walks through Rock Creek Park with Colonel Edward Davison, a poet, and like Colonel Greene, a lover of trees.

He loved to sing and a perfect day to him would have been a long walk through a woods in early spring with good companions all possessed of rich melodious voices lifted in song.

His happiest vacations may have been in those years when he stole a few weeks to go to the Bread Loaf Writers' conferences in Vermont. There he spent long, enjoyable hours in rich talk with poets and novelists.

WE have written much here of Colonel Greene as an editor and we have written frankly because we who loved and respected him know that he would have wanted it that way. And we have also tried to catch in words something of Joe Greene the man—the warm-hearted, thoughtful, gentlemanly man who was our friend and yours.

But there was also Joseph Ingham Greene, O-15267, Infantry, U.S.A. Indeed all the other Joe Greenes—the editor and writer, the warm, generous, gentlemanly friend—were conditioned by the all-important fact that Joe Greene had a deep and abiding love for his chosen profession of arms.

His generation has seen much of war. He was nineteen when the first World War began and he joined the Army a few months later. He didn't get overseas, but he liked the taste of Army life and word has come down from those now distant days that Joe Greene was a crackerjack private first class and corporal. He won an Army appointment to West Point when such appointments were not plentiful and competition was keen.

In the years leading up to World War II it saddened him at times to see how some of his comrades and colleagues could so far lose interest in their profession as to put more emphasis on sports than on training. Nothing was more exciting to him than a hard day of training in the field. He believed that the competitive spirit of sports could be transferred to training and he sought to establish this. Once when commanding a machine gun platoon, he worked to make machine gunnery as exciting to his men as a game of football. He was succeeding until higher authority sent down a directive that two of his key men should be excused from training in order to play on the regimental baseball team.

It is a mark of Joe Greene's qualities of leadership that he could excite men's interest in machine gunnery. His great capacity for sharing in the joys and sorrows, the tears and laughter of those around him kindled fires of loyalty and devotion in men. Joe Greene would have been a great battlefield leader.

It was his personal tragedy that this was not to be. When the Second World War came around he was a fitter candidate for Walter Reed Hospital and a disability retiring board than the command of a regiment. But he didn't want to retire and so he fought off the doctors, and the *Infantry Journal* contributed mightily to the war effort in ways that only Colonel Greene had the vision to see.

His perception and his knowledge of soldiers and their trade gathered through thirty years of practicing the soldier's trade stood him in good stead and he was a staunch

and vocal advocate of the ground fighting man during those long years when too few stay-at-home Americans understood what it was their soldier sons were enduring.

He was one of a handful of officers on duty in General McNair's ground force headquarters during the war who thought long and hard about proper recognition for the combat infantryman. This small group was largely instrumental in the adoption of that cherished emblem: the Combat Infantryman's Badge.

Men who rose high in the service during and since the war had much respect and affection for Joe Greene. He was a good soldier by their exacting standards. One of his most treasured mementos was a totally unexpected note he received from General George C. Marshall. Written on the stationery of the Chief of Staff of the Army and dated 24 September 1942, the note read:

Dear Colonel Greene:

I wish to express my appreciation for the distinction and high professional competence with which the Infantry Journal, under your editorship, has served the Army.

Faithfully yours,

MARSHALL

Colonel Greene was deeply affected by this note. In the margin there appears in his handwriting this touching comment: "How typical of General Marshall's thoughtfulness that he should find the time to do this in the midst of war."

He enjoyed the company of young officers and when Colonel Greene would see one in the offices of the association, he would unfailingly talk to him and show him about. One of his great regrets was that he could so seldom find the time to visit Forts Benning and Sill and other posts where he could again get the feeling of service. He invariably returned from such visits refreshed in mind and spirit. In the week of his death he had visited Fort Sill with another member of the staff who reports that Colonel Greene had had a wonderful time visiting with the young officers in the BOQ to which he was assigned.

There is not an old employee of the Association who cannot recall more than one act of considerate kindness Colonel Greene had shown him, whether at a time of personal distress or unexpectedly and for no reason except that Colonel Greene had a deep feeling of kinship with all of his subordinates.

WE are able to speak of Joe Greene as the fair-minded and indulgent boss who never spared himself. His contemporaries in uniform could and do remember him as a loyal and friendly comrade in arms. He often spoke of the happy days at Fort Benning, and in the Philippines, and in China, when officers who had been lieutenants for years (and he among them) worked and studied and thought hard about future war and enjoyed the rich, satisfying talk of good companions sincerely interested in exploring the depths of a subject.

His oldest and most intimate friends know what they and the Army have lost in the death of Joe Greene. As one of them wrote when the sad news came to him: "The thing has just plain knocked the hell out of me. . . . Joe was truly the greatest gentleman of his day, a gentleman of the old school—warm-hearted, generous, thoughtful of everyone. His untimely death is a heavy blow to the whole Army—a heavier one that it knows. . . . We shall not see his like again."

We shall not indeed.

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ILLUSTRATED BY MAJOR LACHLAN FIELD

Where Is the Regimental Commander?

BRIGADIER GENERAL GEORGE E. LYNCH

It depends upon the type of action, bearing in mind, however, that the regimental commander cannot directly influence squads and platoons but must exert his battle leadership through his staff, and his battalion and company commanders

I AM sure this matter has bothered a number of commanders, for there is considerable emotional and psychological content in it aside from the central question of the location from which the regimental commander can best influ-

ence the action of his battalions and companies.

The current manuals give this guidance to the perplexed commander:

Field Manual 100-5 says, in paragraph 89: 'He keeps in close touch with all

subordinate units by means of personal visits and observations.'

And in paragraph 128: 'After providing for the issuance of orders, the commander places himself where he can best control the course of action and exert



Paragraph 312 adds: "In an advance, commanders and their staffs are well forward. The commander goes where he can best control the operation, usually with his principal columns or with the column along which the axis of signal communications is being established. . . ."

Field Manual 7-40 gives essentially the same guidance as 100-5.

Let it be clear that we are speaking of battle situations rather than training maneuvers or field exercises. In infantry unit training more often than not the commander is acting in an observer or inspector capacity, over and above commanding.

VENTURING to prescribe just where any commander should go or be during battle is an impossibility which the field manuals wisely recognize. It must be determined by the conditions of each situation. Situations can be typified but in practice each contains enough variables to cause at least a momentary thought by the commander as to where he should place himself.

In addition, temperament enters into the matter. I do not mean different degrees of physical courage between commanders, although, commanders being men, this undeniably exists. What I do mean is that infantry commanders, under pressure of battle, find different natural outlets for this pressure which builds up as the battle grows. One commander cannot resist the compelling attraction of getting into action and participating in the fight. Another feels he must see everything that is happening in his zone. Another cannot avoid the pressing need to think ahead and foresee the results of the current action and plan and make arrangements for whatever action seems necessary to follow. Another feels compelled to supervise his own staff or the commander and staff of one of his combat team or regimental units. There are any number of important activities which, depending on the make-up of the commander, can engage his attention. And in pursuit of any of them he may feel that he has selected the critical activity for his attention at the time. At the risk of offending other regimental commanders of World War II and Korea who have worked out their own solutions, I will try to set down my thoughts and some conclusions concerning this question which should be of interest to the infantry commander.

BRIGADIER GENERAL GEORGE E. LYNCH is Assistant Division Commander of the 43d Infantry Division. Since he graduated from West Point in 1929 he has been both an infantryman and a field artilleryman. In 1950 he completed the course at the National War College.

AUGUST, 1953

The regimental commander does not belong out in a reconnaissance group of this kind except when the group is a part of the regimental combat team. The reconnaissance group performing its mission separately from the action or disposition of the regiment can report the information on which the regimental commander may base his initial action and set his troops in motion. The deployment of the regiment would be delayed if its commander were some distance off with the reconnaissance unit, trying to relay to his battalion and other commanders information which can best be given person to person.

But if, as often happens, the reconnaissance element is a part of a motorized combat team column, we have another matter. The action in a sense has already started, the order of battle has been arranged. Once the enemy has been met, the results of the clash are often determined by the speed with which combat team elements can be brought into action.

In infantry artillery actions of pre-World War II days, uncomplicated by motors and tanks, we were taught that in a moving column the commander belonged at the head of his main body or between the tail of the advance guard and the main body. In terms of motorized movement of combined arms, this position for the combat team commander would seem to be the best one to forfeit to the enemy that jump in time which may decide the battle. Here the advance guard might consist of a reconnaissance platoon, an infantry battalion (in trucks), a tank platoon, a heavy mortar platoon, an engineer platoon and an artillery battery. This mixed element, all on wheels or tracks, would occupy over three miles of road space—road space which, once occupied by a column, does not allow easy doubling by other vehicles.

Once he is committed to a position behind or in the rear of the column, this regimental commander cannot see the situation about which he must make some early decisions. Getting up to a position where he can intelligently form his decision may use up precious time he cannot afford to lose. No, in this case he should be following the reconnaissance element, somewhere with the leading rifle company, preferably with his advance guard commander.

He is not there to give that commander detailed instructions but to make his combat team plan and to issue instructions to the elements of his column or columns. The commanders of these elements should be at the head of the main body rather than with their units. Hav-

Fluid Situations

MOTORIZED or mechanized reconnaissance is generally found in a rapidly moving or crumbling situation.



ing satisfied himself that the advance guard is proceeding with its work, the regimental commander should leave the advance guard and see to the deployment of the rest of his column.

Now this is a touchy matter. Many commanders think they ought not to be seen leaving an area where action is developing or soon expected. Afraid of criticism by their own troops or loss of prestige, they prefer to stay at the spot, even when this means neglect of the activities of the bulk of their command. But important mistakes may well be averted if he leaves the point of developing action and goes back to see that those initial movements of the rest of his command on which the whole action depends are started in the way he had envisioned and ordered them.

It is more important to see that all the forces are brought to bear as intended than to see that just one of them is doing well and merely hoping that the rest are carrying on.

Once he is satisfied that the whole of his force is moving in harmony with his plans, then the commander can select his post where he wants to and as the developing situation requires.

Foot Patrols

ACCOMPANYING foot patrols into areas behind the enemy lines in static situations is also a frequent temptation to active regimental commanders. There is little harm and possibly some good in

yielding to this temptation. Contrary to popular impression, such patrols are not extremely dangerous. They incur few casualties. Probably more casualties are received at battalion CPs and dumps from mortar and artillery fire than small patrol actions receive. Going on patrols builds up a certain amount of prestige in his own unit but his information is not much improved beyond what the patrol report contains. One patrol can only see a very limited area.

Observation Posts

THE use of OPs by the regimental commander is a matter of judgment. An observer, visiting me during the early campaigns in Italy, sat down with a list of questions he was to ask me, and one of them was this: "During a battle, do you command your regiment from your CP or an OP?" The thought behind this question may have been that the good commander went to his OP and roosted there until the battle was over, while the timid commander hung on to the end of a telephone wire in his CP. But of course, there is no rule. I have tried both ways and still other ways.

At the attack of Monte La Difesa which was a part of the 1943-44 winter battle for Cassino and my first combat action as a regimental commander, I spent most of the first day encumbering an 81mm mortar OP on a crag which was on the outpost line at the start of the battle. From there I observed, searched and looked. Once in a while I saw the fire of a German mortar which my mortar observer would promptly attend to. Or a fleeting sight of a German or American foot soldier working through the trees and bushes. But I never saw anything that would tell me one way or another what to do or when to do it. Considering that it was an hour's climb to reach this desolate rock, my presence there made small difference in the action I was trying to view—and it was a relatively good OP.

Actually, however, I should modify this statement somewhat. During the first thirty minutes after daylight I was able to see that the wind and terrain were adaptable to smoking another mountainside on our right forward flank from which enemy mortar and artillery fire could be directed and from which enemy machine gun fire could hamper our advancing infantry. So, we did smoke that mountain effectively and it gave us no trouble. But after that I could better have been any place else.

Incidentally, there were three other persons with me, all of us peering over the crag, and this drew German mortar

fire, which did no harm but probably annoyed our mortar observer who would have remained undetected if he had been alone. OPs, it can be said, are valuable for forming estimates and materializing the map, but not as a location from which to direct the action.

A VERY common characteristic of ground OPs is that, if they are well forward, say on the outpost line or the line of departure, the view is usually limited to a small segment of the battle area. But if the view does include all of the critical area, then the OP is too far to the rear for good vision or effective command. Regiments in these days operate over generous portions of land, and somehow the action seldom takes place in open, viewable terrain. If the terrain is open, the time of attack is most likely at night.

The Air OP is just another kind of OP. What has been said of ground OPs applies equally except that the regimental commander obtains a much better view of his arena and can form the image of his action more effectively than ever he could from several ground OPs. Even so, the Air OP is not a place from which the regimental commander can best influence the course of action, however much help it may be to him in arriving at his plan of action.

There may be one exception to this statement, the case of a long motorized column. Command of such a column can be conducted from an Air OP, but the Air OP should be abandoned when the column is about to be committed to action.

When Closely Engaged

THE most usual situation finds opposing troops in contact, each with closed flanks. Where, says the regimental commander, should I be? He should usually be at his command post. A US corps commander of World War II says that any commander who is found at his own CP three times in succession by his own immediate commander, should be summarily relieved of his command. The thought behind this rule is good, but any rigid application of it would work havoc. I have visited my battalion commanders and found them in their CPs three times in a row many a time. They may have just returned from visits to their own units; they may be preparing to go to an OP or a company. They may be preparing patrol plans or engaged in any one of the dozens of things a battalion commander must do at his own CP. Or they may just be snatching some needed sleep. No; generally speak-

ing, both regimental and battalion commanders must spend at least two-thirds of their time at their CPs if they are to get the things done they must do.

Visiting by the regimental commander is essential. But he visits outside of his own area rarely, and must then be certain his own staff and the division staff know where he is. In battle, even though the situation seems quiet, visits to division headquarters are infrequent and usually unnecessary. The division commander and his staff by their own visits furnish the regimental commander all he needs from above.

Every day the regimental commander should visit at least two of his battalions. Each time he can usually visit one of the companies of the battalions. Sometimes terrain, weather and discourtesies of the enemy make such visiting time-consuming and slow. A few minutes at an OP while in the battalion area is usually profitable. But at none of the places he visits should the regimental commander drag things out beyond the time he needs for the real purpose of his visit. If he merely wants to see for himself the state of mind of a battalion commander who the day before received a near-miss mortar shell, he stays long enough to see that the near-missee is not too badly shaken. He may verify his own impression by tactful talk with some officer of the battalion—and then leave. This is not to say that he takes an official attitude or creates an impression of haste. Informality and an easy feeling of understanding are fundamental. And whatever else he may feel about his visits, the commander must always remember that his presence unavoidably slows down or stops the business that usually must go on in every CP he visits.

It is a strong temptation to the regimental commander, once he arrives at a battalion CP actively engaged in an attack or in defending against an enemy thrust, and once he has received a summary of the situation and possibly viewed a part of the action—then to settle down and supervise the battalion commander and his staff in their handling of the situation. This procedure may possibly be justified when the regimental commander uses it to form an opinion of a battalion commander of whom he is uncertain. But even then it is doubtful, for there are other tests that can be applied for the same purpose.

What does happen when he camps on a battalion this way? If the battalion commander is a good one, doing a good job, his attention is diverted from the

things which should have his whole attention. He feels impelled to stay at the CP when he ought to leave it. Or he feels impelled to get out of it when he possibly should stay at it. The regimental commander cannot avoid the inclination to intervene or suggest other courses of action or refinements of the course the battalion commander is following. The battalion commander likewise can't help feeling that his duties of command have been invaded, and he becomes frustrated or annoyed or decides that the regimental commander has taken over the initiative and so sits back and waits for instructions as the battalion action progresses. The regimental commander, without so intending, has unjustly seized his subordinate's command, crippled his initiative and possibly damaged his usefulness for future operations. The only exception when "seizure of command" can be justified is when a battalion commander has demonstrated his ineptitude. This should not happen more than two or three times before replacement is arranged.

It is a good practice to time your visits so as to be at a subordinate CP at mealtime. This, of course, only applies in stable situations, for in the attack and other more active phases of operations, mealtimes are unpredictable. No matter what the fare may be, the act of eating with the subordinate commander and his staff draws the group together, encourages understanding and talk that may be helpful. This seems so obvious as hardly deserving of mention. But I have not observed it to be the common practice it should be.

In the Attack

Attacks launched from assembly positions or positions in contact with the enemy, it is important for the regimental commander to observe the jump-off of his major elements or as much of them as the situation will allow, even though it is at night—when he can probably learn as well by ear as by eye whether his plan is developing as envisioned. If the attack begins by movement of troops from assembly areas to a line of departure, again even in the nighttime, the regimental commander should post himself to see that the movement starts on time as planned, and he should accompany the major unit in its movement to the attack. So often there are misunderstandings or mishaps in such forward movements or in the actual jump-off from the line of departure, that instant knowledge of changes in, or failure of, plans will enable the regimental commander to effect other changes and

co-ordination to make possible the successful continuance of his original plan, or else prevent a disastrous outcome from a plan gone wrong. This is particularly true in night attacks and attacks that start in darkness and continue in daylight.

PERHAPS I can illustrate from personal experience a situation that showed how the regimental commander needs to weigh carefully his choice of location. The time was 30 May 1944, the eighth day of the operations of VI Corps to break out of the Anzio beachhead. Heroic and costly efforts had been made to smash the German defenses. Many gains had been made and some attacks had failed; but the Allied forces were not achieving a rapid breakout. The 36th Infantry Division constituted VI Corps reserve. As the beachhead expanded, units of the division continuously moved to forward assembly areas so as to be more available for rapid commitment. The usual and onerous task of a reserve force plagued us, that of having several plans on hand so we could quickly start whatever course of action the corps commander might choose. A new plan, involving reconnaissance for and selection of assembly areas from which it was expected the 36th Division might launch an attack through the 34th Division, was received at the CP of my regiment, the 142d Infantry. I decided that the situation was too uncertain to leave my CP for any appreciable period of time. I also felt that this uncertainty made it necessary for battalion commanders to stay in the assembly areas with their battalions. So, a reconnaissance party consisting of the regimental executive, the battalion executives and a number of unit guides was sent to select routes and assembly areas and to obtain information of the area in which this plan, if executed, would place the regiment.

Within two hours of the time this party started out, my liaison officer at Division headquarters arrived breathless, with instructions for me to report immediately to Division headquarters for orders. (We had so recently arrived at that particular assembly area that telephone communication had not yet been established. I assume also that radio security was distrusted.) At Division headquarters I learned, it now being about 1300 hours, that my regiment was to entruck, move about eighteen miles to the right flank, and prepare and launch an attack after dark that night.

Full darkness was expected by 2200 hours, so we had nine hours to accom-

plish the many actions leading to an attack, an attack not envisioned in any of our preliminary planning. It is clear that precious time was saved by the fact that the key commanders were right at their CPs and not off somewhere on a reconnaissance. Every minute of that time and the use of several extraordinary measures were vital to the successful launching of our attack that night. Even with this saving of time, the leading battalion was unable to cross the outpost line until 0100 that night. The initial and key objectives it was hoped to reach by daylight were reached with no more than a half hour margin to spare. Time was the irreplaceable ingredient.

THE need for the regimental commander to see his troops cross their line of departure in the attack was clearly apparent later in this action. The three battalions had arrived in forward assembly areas. Commanders down to include those of the companies had viewed the initial objectives which were more than two miles behind the German front and two thousand feet higher than our outpost line. By 1000 hours, orders had been issued, supplies had been prepared for man-pack and the units stripped down for mountain fighting. The regiment moved out of assembly areas in a column of battalions.

A reduced regimental command group moved out at the same time as the leading battalion, but arrived at the outpost line where final co-ordination was to be effected, ahead of this battalion. This was understandable for the movement of a battalion in the dark is slower and more complicated than any rule of thumb ever envisions. This time movement was further hindered by the cross-movements of other units beginning a relief of the front-line unit through which we were passing. This relief was supposed to be done after the 142d Infantry had passed through. But the planned timing required considerable concurrent movement of other troops. Thus the situation held nightmare capabilities apparent to any infantryman.

After waiting at the outpost line an hour for the leading battalion to arrive, the S3 and I set out by separate courses to search for it. We each found one of the two leading companies of the battalion (both they and the battalion commander were uncertain of their location) and led them to their jump-off position. Thereafter, the attack went well and the key objectives were in our hands by daylight, but with a slim, uncomfortable margin of time.

The initial objectives of this action

were of limited depth. But success in seizing them was to be followed by a continuing foot movement through the Alban Hills with Rome as the ultimate objective. As in a motor movement with the future uncertain, such an action as this required the regimental commander to keep himself and a small command group on a mobile basis moving along with the troops. The situation did not allow successive establishment of formal CPs in echeloned style with moves made each time enough ground was gained. The regimental commander and the rest of his mobile group accompanies or follows his leading battalion so he can see his situation and act without delay. Time is almost always the key. Communications may suffer somewhat with this increase of mobility. After the action I learned that Division headquarters had not been too happy with the number and brevity of the radio reports I had been able to send. But technology should eventually overcome this embarrassment.

And for another thing, I am far from convinced that the regimental commander's presence with an assault rifle company is at all helpful to the success of the company. I have tried it several times but the only clear result I could see was that the company commander got flustered and embarrassed by my being there. I undoubtedly hampered his freedom of action and, though the men probably enjoyed seeing the colonel uncomfortable too, I doubt if I inspired them to anything they wouldn't have done anyway. Again, to guard against faulty conclusions, such an excursion in the nature of a visit is good. But the visit should not be prolonged. The regimental commander can be seen by men of the company, and if things are awry he can do something to correct the situation. But he should not seize the captain's command.

The Regimental Reserve

THE regiment usually has a reserve which by the nature of battle is expected to furnish the punch that will determine the outcome. However good the regimental executive or S3 may be, the regimental commander must so arrange matters that he himself visits the places he must visit, observes the actions important to his planning and thinking and keeps his own planning up to and ahead of the course of the battle; so that he stays in a position to give clear instructions to the right people when he wants to put the weight of his last battalion into the balance. He can usually best issue orders to the reserve battalion

commander from his CP or from a suitable (and accessible) OP.

Since much of the regimental commander's time must be spent at his CP the location of it deserves some discussion.

In the situation where the regimental commander accompanies his leading battalion, his headquarters organization, a cumbersome and initially a somewhat inert affair, can best travel in the center of gravity of the column, between second and third battalions. A moderate amount of mobile means of communications is with the commander, so he can effectively carry on up forward until the situation clarifies and the more extensive headquarters operations needed as the battle develops can be set in motion.

In the offense, or when passage from the defense to the offense is planned, the CP should be placed with reference to the roads and trails and toward the flank that promises most success. Or if the direction of success cannot be predicted, it should be near the center of the area. The exact location depends on the road nets.

ONE common error is to choose a location from which wire communications can be laid along convenient roads to each of the regiment's battalions and rear installations. Such a location generally puts the command post too far to the rear. Equally good communications can be had from some more forward location. Communications officers should remember that most failures of wire communications are caused by friendly vehicles and enemy artillery and mortar fire both of which are dense along roads and at road junctions. Wire laid across country is less subject to these things and cuts down the endless amount of wire repairing required with wire circuits laid along roads.

Location of the command post well forward means between eight hundred yards and two miles of the foremost elements, depending on the width of front, the terrain and roads, and the mission. It is not inflexible even within these distances. Even when the command post cannot be located near a point from which you can view the whole regimental front, or even that part of the front you judge to be most critical, a forward location does allow the commander to hear the important sounds of battle. These sounds often carry their own intelligence before the intelligence system has had time to understand, evaluate and report the enemy actions that cause such sounds. Undeniably, forward

location of the command post encourages the lower echelons to keep their command post locations close to their own troops and lends a certain sense of solidarity and compactness to all who know the situation or see it portrayed on the map.

Visiting Supporting Units

THE three rifle battalions properly get the greater share of the regimental commander's time. Their success depends greatly on the help they receive from the combat team artillery, supporting tanks, and heavy mortars, and from the medical service, the engineers and the administrative services of the combat team. In combined arms actions, these supporting elements must generally be relied on to pull their weight without much supervision from the combat team commander. But in a war of any length there will be periods of inaction or stabilization when the commander should visit these units to learn for himself what they are like and to stimulate in them a feeling of being part of the combat team—of being important enough to the combat team for its commander to be concerned about them, their welfare and their activities.


Regimental Executive

IT should be axiomatic that only in emergencies does the regimental commander or the regimental executive ever leave the command post while the other is away. In many regiments of World War II, the custom of using the regimental executive as the "inside" or "administrative" agent grew into a pattern. This may be said to be a matter of personalities and therefore subject to no rule. But I think there is a better use for the executive.

He can relieve the regimental commander of many of his administrative duties and still have time to perform "outside" tasks. He should visit units, make reconnaissances and be ready at all times to take over in the event misfortune overtakes this commander. But he is in no position to do this if his job has limited him to the administrative side of the picture. At times he may have to take temporary command of one of the battalions—for which he is not well fitted if his scope has been limited to housekeeping.

Influence of the Commander

HAVE given some reasons and purposes for the regimental commander's visits and some methods which have worked. I had hoped to avoid "leader-



ship" because even the mention of this powerful word very nearly takes a volume before the writer can extricate himself. But since leadership is obviously a principal reason for visits, it must be mentioned.

In modern war, both our own and the enemy's weapons cause a great deal of planned dispersion of units and men on the battlefield and new wars will see this tendency increase. The actual weight of powerful infantry units, divisions, in their most forward parts is made up of thinly manned posts scattered over distances, armed with weapons to cover intervening areas, and heavily supported by overhead-firing weapons in the rear. Leadership in these small posts is and must be within each such group.

In a literal sense leadership can be exercised only over those the eye can see. Noncommissioned officers and lieutenants are usually the only persons who can exercise this form of leadership, though sometimes a captain can. But when the captain assumes direct leadership of one of his platoons, he is seizing the privilege and duty of that platoon's commander, who if capable of the job himself has been unjustly dispossessed of it. Indeed his future usefulness and growth may have been impaired.

If the platoon commander has become a casualty and his second in command is not qualified, or if the platoon commander is not big enough for the task, the captain can and should lead the

platoon. But he must find a new platoon commander before another action.

This may seem a far cry from the regimental commander, but I am attempting to show that, in battle, leadership in the sense of direct influence over troops is carried out in different ways at different levels. The higher the echelon, the less the direct influence a commander can exercise over his soldiers. There are many ways the regimental commander can and does influence the men of his regiment. But he must early learn that in battle he has little direct influence over his small units, squads and platoons and little more over his companies. He must, in fact, concentrate his efforts on his captains, majors and lieutenant colonels. His attitudes, views, character and determination are forced into the minds of these officers by every means and at every opportunity until their actions, in turn translated into the actions of the troops, become the realization of the direct influence of the regimental commander. But while centering his attentions on these officers, he does take every opportunity to talk to his men individually or in groups wherever he may see them—a smile, a wave, a word or two, no matter what—the soldier values these attentions and responds to them.

And it is for these reasons that the regimental commander, in selecting for himself the critical spot at the critical time, does so with the purpose of leading his field officers and captains rather than his squads and platoons.

GIVE US BACK OUR PRIDE

An old-timer says we soldiers are homesick for an outfit we can "belong" to.

THREE has been a lot of noise about ways to make the Army an attractive career in order to get the high-class young men that the Army will need for high positions in twenty or thirty years. Some of the noise has to do with being underpaid, curtailment of post exchange privileges, loss of dependent medical care and lack of stabilized tours of duty. All of these have some effect. But nobody in any of the services is starving to death. There are plenty of new 1953 cars around every camp, post, air base and naval installation. Nobody is dying for lack of medical care, and you can still buy a lot at the post exchange.

THE one thing that is making the service unattractive is never mentioned. That is the lack of a sense of accomplishment a soldier can get from doing his duty. There used to be a great sense of pride in the service, pride in doing a job well, pride in being a part of an efficient and effective machine devoted to the defense of our country.

Much if not all of the pride developed in the Army came from a definite feeling of being identified with something. We served with particular units for fairly long periods of time, and built up strong friendships, we worked with people we knew to a common end. In the Army, you had a "home." When you were not on duty with a unit, you had a home in the "Chief's Office" in Washington.

Before the war, units were small, but training was vigorous in spite of obstacles. When you went to school you received instruction from the very cream of the Army. There was drive, energy, and, above all, efficiency in the entire program. You felt alive, and you knew that you were going places with a going concern.

The war didn't change this too much. The regulars were scattered far and wide and became, just as we had always known we would, a small highly trained segment in the entire structure required to fight a major war. But for most of us we still belonged to a "unit," be it a separate tank battalion, a division, or corps. We were part of a team, and what we did affected the entire team. Sometimes the team hubbled and bubbled, but most of the time you were caught up in a tremendous act, in which the individual contributed all that he could for the common cause.

TO DAY the entire picture is changed. Nobody, from the newest selective service recruit, to colonels with thirty years' service, and many generals, belongs to anything. Here today and gone tomorrow. Few officers stay over one year in any one job, unless it's a staff job in the Pentagon. It's the same for enlisted men: old-timers, NCOs, and recruits fresh from training centers, all are casual. Punch a button, out fall the cards, send them all to hell and gone. Through the "pipeline," join a unit, stay a few months, back into the pipeline. Punch the button, officers and enlisted men, old and young, experienced and green, just punch the button, and send them on their way, for everyone in the Army now is a number in an IBM machine.

Nobody has a home any more. The bright young staff officers shy away from com-

mand. Get on the staff. You can make decisions without responsibility. Get on the staff, your efficiency rating is bound to be high, no one low-rates a staff officer. Get on the staff, you can't get your throat cut because of the VD rate, and the AWOL rate.

THREE are too many "staff studies" and too much talk; not enough decisive action. The Army is waiting for the strong, clear voice of command; a voice that will blow away the fog imposed by boards and committees and *ad hoc* groups of well-meaning advisers; a voice that will give meaning and direction to an Army that is sound, but bewildered. Look at what we have been doing.

Who worries about training the "young idea how to shoot"? Marksmanship doesn't count for too much any more. Are your TI&E bulletin boards up to date and sparkling with the gems of wisdom dispensed by higher authority? Don't bother to really get down and know your men and really talk to them about the things that are a soldier's life.

And watch your Supply Economy Program. Do you have the very latest slogan pasted in every nook and corner? What does it matter if you have only about one-third of the maintenance personnel required to keep your equipment in shape? Why worry because you have been issued tanks costing over 350,000 dollars apiece but have never been issued the tools to keep them in proper condition?

Is morale low? Don't give a soldier pride in his unit. Don't train him in the essentials of a soldier's knowledge until he knows that he's the best damn soldier in the best damn squad, in the best damn platoon in the best damn company in the best damn battalion in the Army. That isn't necessary any more. Just give him a bright scarf to wear around his neck, and a fancy cord to wear around his shoulder.

THREE must be a commander. The General Staff should become *the general's staff*, with the G's functioning as responsible advisers. Put the crown back on the troop commander and pat him on the back once in a while. Honor the troop commander above the staff when he is good, and bounce him out on his ear when he isn't. Cut the staffs back, reduce the pipeline and form enough units to command.

Give everybody a "home," officers and professional enlisted men. Keep your officers and enlisted men in units, under good commanders, and they will carve out a career for themselves.

Put back the "Chiefs" of the combat arms so that every one will have a home, even during those tours of duty when he cannot be with a unit. This is imperative. The combat services are dying on the vine for lack of a strong authoritative spokesman to represent them in the Pentagon. The Chiefs of the technical services are now the tail that is wagging the dog they are supposed to support.

Clear away the undergrowth that prevents positive action, clear away the weeds that prevent efficiency. Once the high command begins to function effectively and efficiently, we will have our pride back.

You don't believe it? Just ask that young captain, or that young lieutenant colonel. Ask the first sergeant of any unit, or the platoon sergeant sweating over a new group of men in a replacement training division. What! They all said the same thing. "Sure, we need more pay, you have to live, but that isn't everything. I love the Army, and I keep staying on because I just can't help believing that some day someone will come along and there will be a *change*, and we'll have an army again."

A National Guardsman says that if we're really serious about creating a Ready Reserve force it is time to

FISH OR CUT BAIT

COLONEL ROBERT F. COCKLIN

THERE is evidence that the Pentagon and Congress have embarked on the almost-annual re-evaluation of the Army Reserve program. Despite the passage last year of the Armed Forces Reserve Act, the so-called "Magna Charta" for the Reserves, it appears now that it wasn't quite what they wanted after all and the Reserve Officers' Association which fought long and hard for it is back looking for more service secretaries and a larger military staff to look after the Reserves. There are vague stirrings in other directions too, and if Congress can only find the time, a full session of oratory, and very little in the way of concrete accomplishment that will honestly help to increase the size and efficiency of our civilian components can be expected to result.

Excess verbiage and compromise are habitual when this subject comes up, so a brief examination of some of the pertinent facts that always seem to get way-laid should be worthwhile.

Stated briefly, our whole Reserve program revolves around one basic fact: since the end of World War II the National Guard has delivered the goods and the Reserve has not. There are a variety of reasons for this and none will be overcome by getting bigger staff sections or more under or assistant secretaries.

Stripped of all the nice turns of phrase,

there are some good, solid, practical reasons why the Army knows that it must have a National Guard and why it really wants it. Probably the first and foremost reason is the matter of dollars. The Federal Government, in this instance the Department of Defense, must foot the entire bill for the Organized Reserve Program. The Guard on the other hand gets part of its sustenance from state treasuries. For fiscal year 1953, the Congress appropriated \$153,300,000 to support the activities of the Army National Guard. The several states and their political subdivisions likewise anted up almost \$100,000,000 in support of the National Guard during the same period. Even the most rabid exponent of the Army Reserve would have to admit that no such sums in the way of state support could ever be raised to back a purely federal reserve force.

What's more, the Chief of National Guard Bureau, as a primary program director, was responsible for establishing and justifying the amounts the Guard received from the Federal Government. And the Guard helped push the budget through Congress. With the terrific economy pressures being exerted against the Pentagon, is it any wonder that a reserve force that can obtain \$100,000,000 from state taxpayers is in high favor?

Actually, this financial picture goes even farther than the appropriations indicate. Not only is the dollar support there but also the National Guard provides a reservoir of men and equipment that is readily available to the regular services in the event of an emergency. After the bell rang on Korea, the Army National Guard turned over to the Army \$193,000,000 worth of tanks, trucks, radios, recoilless weapons and other items which had been paid for out of Federal funds appropriated for the National Guard. In addition, National Guard units that were called to active duty took with them an additional billion dollars worth of equipment. Most of this equipment, incident-

ally, stayed with the Army. When National Guardsmen were released from Federal service, they came home complete with duffel bag and the clothes on their backs, and that's about all. The money for stockpiling and maintenance of such quantities of equipment as the Guard had in 1950 would never have been appropriated to the Army for its reserves. Therefore the Guard's stockpile represents a welcome backlog when the sirens of war or "police actions" sound off in the Pentagon.

Another financial reason why the Guard merits support lies in the more than \$500,000,000 worth of state-owned armories, camps, and other training facilities. To replace these would cost well over two billion dollars and it seems highly doubtful that the states would relinquish these properties without adequate compensation.

In the past (and with some justification), the Guard was criticized for playing politics and having "political" officers. Since the Regular Army and Air Force have been given the veto power on Guard commissions and promotions, this whipping boy has lost his usefulness.

One other obstacle—either real or imagined—has likewise gone by the board. There was a time when each governor had to be consulted on any and all plans to send the Guard out of the state for training. Written agreements now exist which not only readily facilitate this kind of training but permit the calling to duty of certain units without clearing them through the governor.

Let's look now at the job that has been done in organizing, recruiting and training civilian-component units, which is, after all, the basic consideration. Just before the Korean emergency, the Guard had allotted 98 per cent of the 5,379 units in its troop basis and 95 per cent of these units had surpassed and maintained the strength necessary to gain and keep Federal recognition. This was done even though the Guard accepted a much higher troop basis than it originally wanted and was in competition with the regular services, the Army Reserve, and the draft board for men. The Army Reserve program, on the other hand, has been undergoing constant change and it is difficult to arrive at any figures that would provide a fair comparison. The Reserve did find, however, that when it was authorized to establish so-called "Class A" units which would be comparable in status to National Guard units, it was unable to even organize any appreciable numbers of units.

COLONEL ROBERT F. COCKLIN, Artillery NGUS, needs no introduction to our readers in his dual capacity as Artillery Editor and Advertising Director of this magazine. But he is also Chief of Staff of the District of Columbia National Guard and in six short years has become an ardent and faithful Guardsman. He entered the Army in 1942, attended the artillery OCS at Fort Sill, and served in the Pacific with the 93d Infantry Division. After the war he was Associate Editor of *The Field Artillery Journal* for a time and then joined the staff of *The National Guardsman*. He joined the staff of the COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL when it began publication in 1950.

That program has never attained even minimum goals.

Why should the National Guard be able to accomplish these things and get such support when the Reserve can't? There are many reasons. There is evidence, for example, that those citizen-soldiers who wish actively to engage in military training gravitate toward the National Guard because it is well organized, has the units, equipment, pay and training facilities. This doesn't leave many like-minded patriots for the Reserve to draw on.

Certainly a good bit of state and local support for the Guard has its roots in the historical dual-mission status of the Guard. Local support is vital, not because state legislators feel sorry for the Federal budget, but because the National Guard is a state force the governors can use in disasters and emergencies and for maintaining internal security. As a "force in being" it has probably stopped more riots and public disorders without being called out than it has when called out.

You can't discount either the long and colorful history of the Guard and its standing, particularly in the smaller cities and towns where service in the local Guard unit is, by long tradition, an honor and a privilege. These things give the Guard a community tie which the purely Federal Reserve program can never get.

In the matter of officers, there has never been available to the Guard or Reserves a better qualified and trained group of officers than exists today. Practically every officer in the National Guard has had World War II combat experience and many are now returning from their additional Korean tours. The same is true of the officers in the Army Reserve.

The National Guard is a purely voluntary force . . . and therein lie both its greatest strength and its greatest weakness. It makes the Guard stronger because the men who join the Guard are there because they want to be. At the same time though, it weakens the Guard because valuable training time must be devoted to recruiting in order to keep the units up to strength. This has naturally resulted in proposals to draft young men into the Guard or some similar method of forced service in the Guard. Most Guard leaders strongly oppose such measures. They want the Guard to remain a voluntary service (despite the time and difficulties in recruiting), and they have not yet seen a workable method of forcing civilians to attend training sessions against their will.

Both the Army Reserve and the National Guard have found that the wording of the Universal Military Training and the Selective Service Acts which requires draftees to fulfill a reserve obligation after their active duty service is just words and that these men are not attending drills or joining organized units in any appreciable numbers. The law contains neither the teeth nor the incentive to induce veterans to enroll voluntarily when they can satisfy the legal requirements by letting their names be carried in the index card files.

THAT leads into the biggest problem in the whole civilian component picture . . . how to get citizen-soldier units whipped into shape so that a minimum of training time after mobilization is required before the unit is combat-ready in the fullest sense. The Korean emergency showed that we had come a long way in this direction since mobilization for World War II. But we're still not doing well enough.

Strength is a big part of the problem, to be sure. Also, Regular Army instructor personnel have been in very short supply. Then, too, you can only expect citizen-soldiers to put in so much time without completely neglecting their families and their means of livelihood. A typical National Guard unit commander puts in two nights a week (one administrative, and one training), six week-ends a year, fifteen field training days, plus assorted inspections, parades, and other ceremonies and meetings. And he gets paid for only the regularly scheduled program; the rest is on him and his family. This aspect of the problem must be met by making every moment of the training time worthwhile. Fortunately progress is being made in this direction.

IF we are to build a really strong citizen Reserve, we are going to have to face the facts as they exist—even though we may wish them to be different. We've got to provide a place for all officers and enlisted men who want to participate actively, and we've got to keep a firmer grip on those who will only fulfill that

portion of their military obligation that is forced on them. Those who serve voluntarily and actively in a Reserve or National Guard component are certainly entitled to greater consideration in matters of pay and promotion than those who have to be coerced into serving their country.

Several schemes have been advanced in the past for strengthening our Reserve components. In a past issue of COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL a Reserve colonel advanced a good suggestion. He would have all enlisted men serve in organized National Guard units. Each of the Guard units would have as satellites one, two, or three Reserve units composed wholly of officers. The Reserve officers could take on some of the instruction—the Guard units would have some vitally needed help and the training for all would be greatly improved. Such a program as this has the merit of simplicity. It seems entirely workable except in those few regions where there isn't a National Guard outfit.


Looking a little farther into the future, there is always the possibility of the National Guard and Army Reserve becoming the training vehicle in full or in part for a real Universal Military Training program. If reserve duty were made an alternative to active duty, reserve ranks would fill up fast. But this would not be fair in time of emergency such as now exists. It is for the future.

One alternative for these times would be to re-draft to active duty those draftees who fail to fulfill their reserve obligation. Such action, if diligently pursued, would supply the greatest single source of reluctant patriots for the immediate future. Coming back to our earlier points though, there would have to be a greatly expanded National Guard, since the Guard has the facilities and equipment and the Reserve does not.

THERE may be a better solution and we would stand a better chance of finding it if the Reserve program could be evaluated dispassionately and realistically. We cannot afford the illusion of strength created by millions of names in filing cabinets. We need organized and operating civilian component units training the maximum number of citizen-soldiers.

The National Guard needs a "Magna Charta" for the 1950s. Take it off George Washington's broad back and out from behind the militia clause of the Constitution. It can stand on its feet and it can deliver the goods. And that should be the determining factor.





By moving the piece forward maximum elevation can be attained. However, one disadvantage is a loss of 400 mils in deflection.

OVERHEAD COVER FOR ARTILLERY

CAPTAIN RICHARD JENNINGS

A frontal view of the bunkers shows that cannoneers have almost complete protection against air bursts, and limited protection against ground bursts, even on hits and near hits.



AT twilight on 6 October 1952, about 200 rounds of 76mm and 122mm artillery whistled into the Able and Baker positions of the 7th Division's 48th Field Artillery near Kumwha, Korea. Manning their howitzers in the midst of the fire, the cannoneers returned the fire of the enemy batteries.

Most of the incoming rounds fell over but one burst directly in front of the Number 2 gun of Baker Battery, knocking the tube from the carriage and wounding the chief of section and two cannoneers.

The Chinese fire was part of the preparation for the CCF attack on White Horse Mountain to the west, and followed the normal Chinese practice of taking all known artillery and mortar positions under fire during an attack. Although our counterbattery fire soon silenced the enemy guns, the enemy did succeed in knocking out one of our howitzers and partially neutralized the ability of the two batteries to fire.

During the many months of stalemate fighting, Communist artillery had literally gone underground. Tunneled through the Korean mountains and holed up in caves, the Chinese field pieces were becoming increasingly more difficult to locate and destroy. U. N. artillery was finding itself facing a numerically superior, cleverly dug-in artillery force that proved a formidable opponent during the Triangle Hill and later battles.

As an answer to enemy counterbattery fire, the 7th Division's artillery borrowed an idea from the ROK battalions of the 5th Field Artillery Group and developed overhead cover for the individual artillery pieces. While scarcely practicable during a war of movement, the overhead gun bunkers serve as worth

CAPTAIN RICHARD MILBURN JENNINGS, Artillery, has been operations officer and a battery commander since his arrival in Korea in September of 1952. As a battery commander he completed twenty overhead covers in various positions along the 155-mile front. He is a veteran of World War II and a 1945 graduate of Stanford University. He entered the Army in January, 1946.

while protection during a static war.

The 7th Division was withdrawn from the line before work could actually commence, however, and it was not until January 1953 when it returned to the line in the Old Baldy Sector, that the overhead cover program actually got under way.

WORKING against the handicaps of frozen ground and freezing weather, the artillerymen chipped and blasted holes for the uprights, and then constructed the frames of logs and heavy cut timber. The sides were made of planking, and the roof was covered with logs, sandbags and earth. When the sides were completed, earth was bulldozed against them as high as the roof to economize on sandbags and provide better protection and camouflage.

Although the overheads built by the batteries differed slightly in design, a typical model for a 105mm howitzer has a center frame about sixteen feet square supporting a roof over the howitzer while a wing on both sides provides room to shift the trails and to store ammo and section equipment. The front center is cut back a few feet to allow high-angle fire. While it was hoped to obtain 3200 mils traverse, the average bunker allowed only about 2800 mils. This normally provided enough traverse, however, to cover the division front.

THREE are advantages and disadvantages to the overhead cover. Veterans of World War II would probably scoff at it, but in a static war as in Korea, deviations from standard techniques often pay off.

One of the most obvious disadvantages is the limited traverse for both indirect and direct fire. In normal fluid-type war, this disadvantage would be prohibitive, but on the static front in Korea, there have been very few cases of a gun being "called out" because of the overhead. Any deep enemy penetration to the flank of the battery position would of course require the withdrawal of the howitzers from the bunkers and the occupation of alternate gun positions.

Not the least of the drawbacks is the expense involved in time and construction materials. The heavy uprights and the stringers supporting the roof must be constructed of twelve-inch by twelve-inch timbers or equivalent, and, as the engineers kept reminding the artillerymen, even sandbags run into money. By digging the gun pit down several feet and pushing earth on the walls, sand bags were saved.



Rotating bunker gate protects crews from bursts behind the housing. This gate can be opened in a few seconds if the piece must be removed.

The overhead covers have fulfilled their primary function and do protect gun crews and ammunition during enemy shelling. The bunker protects the gunners from fragments from the rear, sides, or directly overhead. The men are vulnerable only to bursts in front of or slightly above the firing aperture or to direct hits on the bunker by heavy caliber shells. It is estimated that the bunker could withstand the hit of a mortar or light artillery piece.

The storage space in the wings of the overhead practically eliminate the need

for conventional ammunition bunkers. Two hundred rounds may be kept comfortably within the overhead, facilitating the handling and preparation of the rounds by the gunners.

Many artillerymen will stick with the requirements of 6400 mil traverse and decry the "Maginot Line" danger of static positions. The fact remains, though, that the overhead covers have permitted our guns, despite enemy shelling, to remain with their primary mission—that of timely and continuous fire support for the infantry.

Bunkers also provide cover for ammunition. This one holds 200 rounds.





LET'S HARNESS THE WEATHER

LIEUTENANT COLONEL
FREDERICK G. WHITE

A LARGE amount of weather information is gathered by many separate agencies at different places in the combat zone, but up to now these data have never been fully integrated, coordinated, evaluated and disseminated for the joint use of all services. It is a job that could be done by the Air-Ground Weather Center which the Tactical Air Force sets up close to the Joint Operations Center.

It is the Joint Operations Center's job to integrate the air and ground effort. It has a fine communications network and so is in a good position to develop its weather activities farther for the advantage of all the services. In the past, divisions and lower units have received limited and often inaccurate weather forecasts through their intelligence channels.

There are more than twenty-five Army units scattered within the combat area of a field army that have weather equipment they use to get ballistic information for the correction of their own gunfire. Here are the types of units and their equipment:

(1) Meteorological sections of Field Artillery observation battalions; radio direction finder, radiosonde (radio sounding device), radiosonde receptor, barometer, psychrometer, theodolite, balloon, anemometer.

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(2) Division artillery meteorological sections (pibal); theodolite, balloon, barometer, psychrometer.

(3) AAA groups; identical equipment to the artillery observation battalion's meteorological section.


(4) AAA brigades; two sections, identical to group, capable of obtaining weather information.

(5) Meteorological sections of infantry heavy mortar battalions; barometer, psychrometer, anemometer.

(6) Meteorological sections of smoke generator battalions; same as infantry heavy mortar battalion.

(7) Guided missiles battalions; weather equipment currently under study subject to change is believed to be barometer, psychrometer, anemometer and possibly theodolite and balloon.

The barometers, of course, give the air pressure; the anemometers tell the surface wind speed and wind direction; the theodolite gives data on the winds



Launching a radiosonde. In the foreground are a Rawin set and a theodolite.

aloft; and the psychrometer shows air temperatures. The radio direction finder, radiosonde and radiosonde receptor are electronic equipment capable of giving the wind speed and direction, temperatures, pressures, and relative humidity at elevations up to one hundred thousand feet.

BUT it isn't good enough to make use of weather information at the big headquarters only. Weather information should be used to help the fighting man accomplish his mission.

Weather experts claim that if all information gathered in the combat area were integrated and evaluated properly, commanders could be given forecasts up to 90 percent accurate for a specific, limited area.


In World War II advantage was seldom taken of such forecasts. Communications channels were not clearly defined and the information came too late to be of value to divisions and their combat units. In Korea weather experts have been assigned as far forward as division. But they report that information is still gathered piecemeal and that all sources and communications channels are not used to full advantage. There are not enough trained forecasters to scatter even thinly across a front.

The chart on this page suggests a weather communications plan which takes advantage of a system that already exists. Without much strain it could handle brief coded weather reports from each station about four times daily.

If we put all our combat area weather equipment in single harness, all ground commanders would have details on fog, snow, hail, rain, low clouds, winds, visibility, and trafficability. And pilots flying close support missions would have the information they need on such things as low clouds, visibility and wind. Moreover, the data that ground units could provide to the Air Force weather center would be of great value since they would greatly improve weather forecasts.

Consolidated weather information would also be a help in forecasting ballistic information for gunfire correction. With long range guided missiles and guns of all different sizes including the 280mm atomic gun in the Army combat area there is need for the most accurate weather information possible. And radiological and bacteriological defense experts are likewise vitally interested in all types of weather information.

Sound weather information is of great interest to practically everybody.



Data from the twenty-five units in a field army that have weather collecting equipment can be coordinated at the weather center at the JOC

THIS IS TACTICS?

LIEUTENANT LEWIS F. VOLPE

This discourse on how and with what the Army fights won't enlighten civilians, but may startle the long-hairs at Leavenworth

WE hear and see constant reference these days to a mysterious and very awesome science called Tactics. Undoubtedly, some confusion exists about this word and its basic fundamentals. We shall eliminate that confusion in this article.

(It should be stated that the material contained herein is unclassified and is in no danger of being classified.) But before we can start we must outline the BIG PICTURE.

The basic purpose of the Army is to defend the country against attack. This it does with the aid of other services, dressed in various shades of blue. Among these are the Waves, the Air Force, the Navy and the Marines. These are collectively referred to as the United States Army Transportation Corps.

The Army is divided into a number of armies (not to be confused with Army). These and the number must always be spelled out (beginning with the First Army). Furthermore, these armies (not to be confused with Army) are sometimes grouped together for tactical reasons into army groups, which are larger armies (but not Army); army groups are also numbered, using Arabic numerals: 6th Army Group.

Since it requires much supplying and servicing to maintain an Army, a basic division of labor arose, and we have branches of service known as either Arms or Services.

The Arms are such branches as the Infantry, Artillery and Combat Graves Registration.

The Services are the supplying and technical branches such as Quartermaster Corps, Medical Corps and Ordnance (which makes laws, known as

LIEUTENANT LEWIS F. VOLPE, Infantry, is on duty with the 5th Infantry Division, Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania. He wrote this piece while enduring the tortures our civilization inflicts on young lieutenants of infantry at Fort Benning.

the Articles of War; when the Air Force was still united with the Army, these were known as the Articles of Confederation). In combat, the Services have the added responsibility of sending up second lieutenants with the daily rations.

THE popular mind recognizes three basic weapons, two of which are bazookas. This is highly untrue. The Army is faced with many different tactical situations in each of which a dif-



... when we wish to kill young horses

ferent weapon plays the primary role. For example, if we wish to kill young horses, we use the Colt .45. This is an amazingly efficient weapon, its effectiveness increasing until it becomes dangerous at arm's length.

The standard infantry weapon is the M1 rifle. The M1 is also known by another name, which is credited to a tearfully grateful French Ambassador during the last war, who remarked to an American general, "M'sieur, this is one ga'rand rifle." The weight of the rifle is 9.75 pounds. After 20 miles, the decimal point drops out.

The junior officer's weapon is the carbine. This is so there won't be too many senior officers.

American machine guns come in two calibers, .30 and .50. Furthermore, there are "heavies" and "lights." The caliber .50, although heavy, is not the "heavy"; the .30 is. But, the .30 is also the "light," the difference between the two .30s being that in some localities, water is more plentiful than air, and is therefore used as a cooling agent.

Mortars are high-trajectory weapons which are very useful in firing over such obstacles as hills, trees, buildings and friendly newsmen. As an alternative, in the latter case, we use a bazooka.

Artillery is classified as "heavy," "me-

dium" or "light." These pieces are always fired by a man in a Piper Cub who pulls a long string.

Any combat action gains much of its shock and surprise from the expert use of tanks and similar armored vehicles. These come in two classes: the best in the world and the next best.

Modern science has made it possible for heavy firepower to be an organic (not a bad word as used here) part of the small infantry unit. The principle of the recoilless rifle has made it possible to have 57mm, 75mm and 105mm guns in the front lines where they can be moved swiftly if the tactical situation demands. An added advantage is that, when surrounded, we can fire in two directions at once.

The tactical groupings employed in combat, from smallest to largest are:

Squad
Section
Detachment
Platoon
Company
Detachment
Battalion
Detachment
Regiment
Detail
Regimental combat team
Division
Corps
Army (Not to be confused with Army)
Army Group

(There is also a tactical group known as a Task Force. It can consist of one man, armed or unarmed, or many thousands of men, armed or unarmed.



... artillery is always fired from a Piper cub

ASQUAD is commanded by a sergeant (except when commanded by someone else). Its purpose in the attack is to close with the enemy, and by skillful use of its bazookas, artillery pieces and atomic weapons, to destroy him. On the other hand, its purpose in the defense is to permit the enemy to close with it and then by skillful use of its bazookas, artillery pieces and atomic weapons, to destroy him.

The squad is a team, and as such, reaches its peak of effectiveness when each man masters his own job and works harmoniously with the rest. The squad, like all teams, has basic formations which it uses as conditions vary. Also, the squad works on a "field" in the sense that it is given a limited frontage in all actions. However, the frontage varies with the mission, the strength of the enemy (or rather his lack of weakness) and the type of terrain. But we can safely say that it rarely exceeds ten miles.

In one of these basic formations, the squad forms itself in a line parallel to the target and rushes it, firing from the hip, knee or ankle, depending on the man's height. This is referred to as "St. Peter's Express."

A variation of this formation, used in early morning or twilight attacks, employs trickery. The squad is aligned parallel to the target, but each man has his back toward it. Then, in the haziness of the weak light, the men slowly inch their way backward. The enemy, seeing this, thinks the squad is running away and becomes overconfident.

When advancing through defiles, valleys or jungles, the "Congo Line" formation is used. This consists of a column of men firing to alternate flanks on each fourth step.

Only in final-type actions, such as ending wars, destroying armies or taking cities, does the squad use a double envelopment. This consists of sending two highly mobile units of riflemen to opposite flanks and in circular motions around the enemy while a crushingly irresistible holding attack is mounted from the front.

The single envelopment is used in ending half a war, destroying half an army or capturing half a city.

In the defense the squad puts its tanks in foxholes, destroys bridges and dams, floods valleys, blows the top off mountains and in general attempts to make a nuisance of itself. But all the while, the squad leader, reading his manuals by the rockets' red glare, knows that the defense is mounted only temporarily when conditions force it upon



. . . the most dangerous man in the world

us, and that an attack will be launched at the earliest moment.

THE next larger unit is the platoon, commanded by the inevitable second lieutenant. He is absolutely necessary to the functioning of the Army, somewhat like an office boy to Wall Street. He is tall, young, brilliant, handsome and terribly confused. The most dangerous man in the world is a young lieutenant with a map.

The platoon, being approximately four times as large as a squad, naturally has within it greater capabilities of sustained firepower, and maneuverability in combat. Also, it has larger weapons than does the squad—especially its atomic weapons.

Platoons are particularly effective in the siege of towns and cities. The orthodox method of pursuing this business is:

(1) Pick a city located on a hill, because pictures of soldiers rushing up a hill are dramatic and make the front pages of newspapers.

(2) Surround the city on only three

sides. This conserves strength and allows for greater concentration.

(3) Begin an air, ground and sea attack (the last may be omitted only if the city is landlocked and if permission is obtained in advance from the army commander [not to be confused with Army] who apologizes in advance to the nearest Admiral-in-Chief for the omission; this is known as liaison which breeds unification). This—the air, ground and sea attack, not the Admiral—will divert the enemy.

(4) Send a patrol into the fourth, unguarded section of the city. This patrol will enter the railroad station and tear up all the tickets, thus preventing retreat, supply or reinforcements.

(5) Sit back and starve them out.

THE company is the smallest unit which carries on its own administration. This means it keeps its own records, feeds its men, and supplies and resupplies itself (this is known as perpetual motion).

The company in combat is usually commanded by a captain, but sometimes by a first lieutenant. A first lieutenant is a second lieutenant who bleached his bars.

Whatever else the company commander might do, he must make a daily phone call to the supply sergeant to order food, ammo and second lieutenants.

The company has a sizable reserve and with it can often launch and sustain a very aggressive attack. The reserve is kept behind during the initial phases of combat. It is the company commander's "ace-in-the-hole" which he uses to exploit weaknesses in the enemy line. When not needed by the company,



. . . S2 has 40 beautiful agents

it is used to relieve any surrounded Marine division in the area.

NEXT in size is the battalion. The battalion has a staff. The staff consists of four sections, referred to (in numerical sequence) as S1; S2; S3; and S4. The duties of the men in these sections are to advise the commander, inform him of the situation, relieve him of details, and to carry out his orders in their respective fields, which are personnel, intelligence, operations and supply.

S2, the intelligence officer, has a special intelligence and reconnaissance platoon, consisting of forty beautiful blondes with mink coats and long cigarette holders, who infiltrate the enemy lines in brand-new station wagons.

The principal duty of the S4, supply officer, consists of screaming into a telephone, "No, we ain't got no white paint." Regimental S4 uses two telephones.

(These staffs are also present in all units larger than the battalion. The only exceptions to the description given above are that the number of officers of the special staff in division and higher the general staff sections are designated as G1, G2, G3 and G4. G2's eighty beautiful redheads wear ermine wraps and ride in luxurious limousines.)

A regiment which numbers more than 3,000 men (except when it numbers less than 3,000 men) is the perfect embodiment of speed, weight and punch needed for sustained actions.

Next in size we have the Regimental Combat Team. It is used to combat regiments.

THE strong right arm of the Army, the unit which can and does deliver the heavy final-type blow is the division. This is the smallest unit in which all arms and services are represented (not parliamentarily, it should be emphasized), and which can carry on a combat action and sustain itself in battles alone.

A corps is a tactical combination of two or more divisions. An army consists of two or more corps, and an army group is a grouping of armies (not to be confused with Army).

Our overseas armies are grouped into Theaters, such as the Asiatic Theater, which is responsible for entertainment in Japan, and the European Theater, which discovered Valli. The USO does not come under these Theaters, but is a subsidiary and independent organization.

Now you know all about the Army.



The Armored Cavalry Regiment (Light) is a skilled recon outfit, not another armored combat command

COMBAT IS

COLONEL SHIPLEY THOMAS

If we ever quit living in the military past, we may find that the Armored Cavalry Regiment (light), now an orphan child of the armor arm, can solve most of our reconnaissance problems of the future. This regiment is not armor, except in name and certain pieces of equipment, but is a Corps reconnaissance outfit. It may well be the Corps Commander's most useful tool in keeping constantly up to date on the enemy, the terrain and the other details he has to know before he can outline his plan of action to his G3. The greater disper-

sion that will be necessary in an atomic war will make this regiment and the photo-interpreters the principal reconnaissance tools of the Corps G2, and through him, of the infantry division G2. The training and methods of use of the Armored Cavalry Regiment (light) are therefore of vital importance.

With the recent release of the details of the 280mm gun, which is capable of firing high-explosive and atomic shells twenty miles or more, we must begin to discuss the effects this weapon will have on the tactics of all arms in land warfare of the future. We would be foolish not to assume that our enemies also have this weapon. Such a gun will force greater dispersal of any concentrations of troops. Each improvement in the range and effectiveness of artillery and the increased mobility of modern forces has resulted in widening the distance between opposing main bodies. This trend continues.

The possession of such a gun, guided missiles, modern bombers, and guerrilla action will all tend to decrease the effectiveness of mass action. The logistical support of great armies, such as were employed in Europe in both world wars, will become increasingly more difficult. Warfare of the future will hardly have a "static" front line with a

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great build-up of men and supplies in rear areas. Instead, the entire theater will be the combat zone. Troops and supplies will either be underground in strongly defended "islands" or on the move and widely dispersed. Greater reliance will be placed on small mobile forces capable of greatly increased fire power. This will place an ever increasing burden on intelligence and reconnaissance staff officers and an ever increasing demand for various reconnaissance agencies both air and ground.

In this kind of warfare the G2 of an infantry division will find it is imperative to maintain constant patrols, sent as deeply as possible into the enemy outpost positions, to the division front, flanks and even in the division's rear.

Indeed would be the G2 who gave this outfit the mission of piercing the enemy's outpost, and developing the "who, what and where" of the enemy's main body and intervening terrain.

But can't the Reconnaissance Company be strengthened by the attachment of a flock of tanks and perhaps a motorized infantry battalion and some artillery? It won't work. The attachment of other troops to a highly trained reconnaissance unit is courting disaster. Of course, the problem of command can be handled through the wording of the order, but the ancient and utterly fallacious theory that every man who wears infantry insignia is a born "sneaker and peeker" isn't tenable. Skilled reconnaissance patrols, be it one man,

the highest quality.

There is a school of reconnaissance by fire. The theory is that you roll along firing at every possible spot where an enemy unit might be lurking, and, from its answering fire (if you have not destroyed it), you learn its position and strength. It may work on green troops, but experienced and disciplined troops pull in their necks, watch the patrol go by, and hit it in its vulnerable and not well-padded rear.

Thorough reconnaissance is not easy. It is one of the arts of war. Those who perform it successfully are masters of the battlefield. But those who look upon it as just another military duty to which any soldier may be detailed will be wondering why they failed and were relieved.

HOW, then, can the G2 of an infantry division get this absolutely vital information for his commander? Unless the commander knows the "who, what and where" of the enemy and the ter-

MORE THAN

CHARGE

There will be the constant threat of guerrilla bands, airborne assaults and long-range missile attacks.

THE answer to this patrol requirement seems simple. G2 has a Reconnaissance Company to do the deep reconnaissance for the division. But is it strong enough? Can 170 officers and men, with seven light tanks, five armored vehicles, three mortars, six rocket launchers, three caliber .50 machine guns, nine caliber .30 machine guns and 124 rifles, wend their way through enemy-held areas safely, surely and usefully? They will need a lot more than the bullet-proof vest and panties to get them there and back. And if they don't get back they aren't useful. This puny force would easily be gobbled up or obliterated by the first strong outpost position it encountered. Foolhardy in-

three men, a squad, a platoon, a company, a battalion or even a regiment, must have tremendous and specific training together. No one is happy about going on a patrol unless he knows that every other man on that patrol is a trained and experienced member of the team. It is very much like mountain climbing. When you start up the precipice, you don't want any novices on the rope.

Personal preferences aren't decisive and men can be ordered to work together. However, on a deep reconnaissance through the enemy's screening force, with the mission of developing the enemy's positions, the study of the terrain, the location of the main body and the capture and interrogation of vitally important prisoners, mixed units untrained as a team are a liability. Deep reconnaissance requires teamwork of

rain, he is in for some very unpleasant surprises. The old maxim still holds true: "It is permissible to be defeated, but never to be surprised."

But the question comes up, how about all those attached specialist teams? The G2 has photo-interpreter, interrogator of prisone ; of war, order of battle, military intelligence interpreter, translator and counterintelligence teams sitting around ready to put on their individual acts. Why not put them to work? They do all they can with the material they have. The photo-interpreters get their raw material from pictures taken from a plane. They produce a lot of valuable information. Valuable, that is, when it is considered with other information. All the other teams (with the exception of counterintelligence which by its nature produces more negative than positive intelligence) rely

upon deep reconnaissance for the raw material on which to work. In World War II, as in World War I, and there is no indication that it will be different the next time, eighty-five percent of all information of the enemy came from captured prisoners and documents. The only source of this vital material is reconnaissance, deep reconnaissance that penetrates the enemy's power.

But the big question still remains: how will the G2 of an infantry division get the raw material for his specialist teams to work on to develop the information of the enemy and the terrain? One source is still available. Each corps and army has an Armored Cavalry Regiment (light) especially designed for this purpose. It is, or should be, trained to do the necessary deep reconnaissance for the two or three infantry divisions of the corps.

THE Armored Cavalry Regiment (light) is designed and made a part of each Corps purely to perform reconnaissance missions. It should have no other duties and, when properly trained and used, will have a full-time job in keeping division G2s and the Corps G2 supplied with the raw material from which the specialist teams can produce usable information of the enemy and the terrain.

But if this is an "armored" unit, shouldn't it be used with other armored units? No, definitely. Armor is "heavy cavalry" and these regiments are specifically labeled "light." The missions of the two are diametrically opposed. "Light cavalry," the Hussars and Light Dragoons of the English and the Uhlans of Germany, is lightly equipped for long and deep rides. Its mission is screening and reconnaissance. It is the cavalry of J. E. B. Stuart, particularly in the first Maryland campaign or around Richmond. Light cavalry, presumably, is habitually out on deep reconnaissance.

Armored divisions are the lineal descendants of the old heavy horse cavalry. The last recorded "charge" of heavy horse was at Soissons, late in the afternoon of 18 August 1918, the first day of that engagement, when the infantry by surprise attack had opened a hole in the German lines several miles wide. Two regiments of the finest French heavy cavalry were sent in to exploit this advantage, and deliver the *coup de grace* to the staggering and bewildered German army. As the trumpets sounded, and the columns fanned out at a gallop, German "trench strafing" planes, seemingly hundreds of them,

tried in vain to rout that cavalry charge with machine-gun fire. They had little effect. But German motorized machine-gun units arrived just in time, unlimbered and did the trick. They decimated that wave of charging horsemen. That was the end of heavy horse cavalry.

Subsequently, in the U.S., two cavalrymen, Adna Chaffee and George Patton, developed the idea of a substitute for heavy horse cavalry, by using the English-invented tank. This gradually became the armored division. As such, armored divisions are usually held in corps reserve awaiting the breakthrough, to go in for the kill or else to swing wide on the flank and sever the life line. Chaffee and Patton received little support and had to improvise the "mechanized brigade," and also to suffer much quite ribald comment. Heinz Guderian, however, hopped on the band wagon. An infantryman himself, he had the vision, and developed the Panzer divisions in the German Army. In Poland, in 1939, he showed what they could do as the successors of the Napoleonic heavy cavalry, and Blitzkrieg became a household word.

THE armored division has its own reconnaissance battalion. It is a "light cavalry" unit designed to do the job for an armored division. But this battalion is not strong enough to go all the way and get the vital, strategic information necessary for a successful operation. The G2 of an armored division must rely on the corps G2 to get this to him. And it must be secured by the Armored Cavalry Regiment (light) which operates under the staff responsibility of the corps G2 for reconnaissance missions (Par. 79, F.M. 30-5).

The Armored Cavalry Regiment (light) is quite different from other "armored" units. The word "armored" in its title is there merely because, in the swallowing of the old cavalry corps, armor found that it had also some "light" cavalry units on its hands.

The following, from F.M. 17-95, dated September 1951, gives the basic doctrine on the employment of the Armored Cavalry Regiment (light). Paragraph 2 reads as follows:

The primary role of the armored cavalry regiment is to engage in security, light combat and reconnaissance missions. The regiment is not designed to engage in combat with hostile armor or strongly organized defenses. The regiment is highly mobile and lightly armored; these characteristics primarily determine its combat role.

As the basic doctrine, it is difficult to understand the point of view of so many

individuals in armor who quite openly deplore the above paragraph, and still insist that this unit must somehow be used as the fourth combat command of an armored division, because the word armor appears in its name. In their enthusiasm for the heavy cavalry role, they forget that many a corps will not have an armored division. There are not enough to go around.

THE thoughts of many of the armored people are quite clearly expressed by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas O. Rooney, Armor, former instructor at the Army Command and General Staff College, in an article, "Put the 'Combat' in Combat Reconnaissance," in the *Military Review* of February 1951. In his first premise, Colonel Rooney appears to confuse the idea of security. "Flank security" is not fighting on the flank. The proper meaning is protecting the flank from surprise. The "blurb" or "come on" of the article states: "*The reconnaissance unit used habitually for flank security or reconnaissance missions is a waste of power.*" In the article proper Colonel Rooney writes:

Let us visualize such an operation [use of the armored regiment (light) as a delaying force]. The armored division, reinforced with corps medium artillery and one battalion of heavy tanks from the armored cavalry group, is the covering force in the corps zone, with a mission of delaying the advance of the enemy for five days.

The armored cavalry regiment (light), reinforced with two battalions of light armored artillery and one battalion of heavy tanks from the armored cavalry group, maintains contact with the enemy and delays the advance of hostile forces until enemy action forces it to withdraw through the initial delaying position of the armored division.

Initially, the regiment operates directly under corps control, providing the corps commander with information of the enemy's advance until such time as the regiment is driven back through the armored division's initial delaying position many miles in front of the corps selected defensive position. Direct communications and liaison between the regiment and the armored division ensure the necessary coordination between the force maintaining contact, and the covering force. The reinforced regiment, with its mobility and firepower, can certainly delay the rapid advance of the enemy even on a broad front, and provide the time required for the covering force to establish its initial delaying position. Upon passing through the initial delaying position of the armored division, the regiment is attached to the armored division for continued combat.

When the regiment is attached, the armored division commander may employ it to protect his flanks, but he should bear in mind the power and

combat capabilities of the regiment. He now has at his disposal the equivalent of a fourth combat command, which enables him to employ three commands on the line, and retain the fourth in reserve. Another formation might be adopted, so as to have two combat commands on the line, with the reserve command and the regiment deployed in subsequent positions to the rear, to ensure depth in his delaying action.

* * *

This example has been used to demonstrate how reconnaissance units can be employed profitably. The habitual use of such a combat unit only for flank security or reconnaissance missions is a waste of available power.

COLONEL ROONEY—and he is vocal of so many in armor—fails to remember that reconnaissance, continued day and night, is vital to the corps commander. This continuous action, conducted by his corps G2, can be the real difference between success and failure.

Surely, even the most ardent advocate of *charge*, that of committing everything to the attack, must consider, in his enthusiasm, that the retention of ten percent of the effective force in continuing reconnaissance and protection from surprise, is fully warranted. A corps commander has usually nine combat teams or combat commands, all relatively of the strength of an infantry regiment, and supporting artillery. In addition, he has one Armored Cavalry Regiment (light). The corps commander's strength, therefore, is nine heavy units and one light. His nine heavy units have been trained for heavy warfare. But one unit—one-tenth of his command—is trained and equipped for quite another kind of warfare. Indeed, the armored cavalry regiment (light) is specifically prohibited from heavy warfare.

Continuous reconnaissance, even during the most serious engagements (to protect the corps from surprise) is always necessary. There may be occasions when the corps commander may decide to throw all of his "heavy units" into the battle, but he must always remember about the possibility of surprise, and keep that vital ten percent of his command on its primary job of "sneaking and peeking" in all possible directions to prevent possible surprise from the front, the flanks and the rear. Only a foolhardy corps commander would commit his last ten percent, his trained reconnaissance troops, before his last command decision had been made.

It is reckless to advocate that this unit, specifically armed, equipped, and (it is hoped) trained for the deep reconnaissance so vital to the life of the whole

corps, should be used as the "fourth combat command" of an armored division—except in extremes.

COMBAT is not all *charge*. In most actions, a skillful corps commander decides upon his tactics after he has studied his enemy. He does not use the same tactics on every enemy formation. If they are green, one thing goes; if they are experienced but tired, another thing goes; but if they are rested, first-class, experienced troops, then that is another matter. Put yourself in the position of the enemy general who found that he was facing General Joe Doaks, when he thought all the time he was facing Patton. He got off easy. But suppose he had based his decisions on the fact that he was facing old, dumb, stubborn General Joe, when it was really Patton!

Wars are not won except by a study of the personal peculiarities of each individual commander. A graphic example of this was a division in World War I. It was made up of Regular Army units. In its first battle, it ran away. The division commander was relieved, a new, tough, experienced old soldier was given command. In two weeks he rounded up the soldiers of the division and by dint of a tremendous personality, changed the 25,000 officers and men of that division into one of the finest fighting organizations in the history of our Army. You cannot fight wars by blueprints laid out in advance. Ovid said, many years before the Christian era, *Fas est ab hostia docere*—It is your duty to study your enemy. Ovid is just as right today as he was then. These "power" experts forget that brute force never won a battle. General Lee had a three-to-one numerical advantage on the first day at Gettysburg, but the lack of current information of the enemy (his cavalry was out doing some such job as Colonel Rooney advocates), left him practically blind on the battlefield, thereby losing his advantage. Had his information of the enemy been adequate, he could have been in Philadelphia on the day he was defeated at Gettysburg.

Of course the rules laid down in field manuals do not always govern. There may come a time when G2 must surrender his Armored Cavalry Regiment (light) to G3 to plug a hole in the line. When the time comes that the commanding general has decided that he knows the enemy's one and only capability and has no further use for information from his G2, and after he has sent his G3 to gather up all the cooks, kitchen police, band, clerks, stenographers, messengers, and "dog robbers"

and lead them forward, arming themselves as they go across the field of battle, and has sent one aide to pack his bag preparatory for a long journey and the other aide to snatch a white sheet from his bed, just in case his guess as to the situation turned out to be correct—then the corps commander may be justified in using his Armored Cavalry Regiment (light) to plug a hole in the line.

THE Armored Cavalry Regiment (light) is neither an offensive nor a defensive unit. It is a reconnaissance unit. The regiment must be trained to avoid combat whenever possible. Its sole mission is to search for information—continuously. It is composed of three reconnaissance battalions, a headquarters company and a service company. Each battalion is capable of acting independently, or the regiment can act as a whole. Each battalion is composed of three reconnaissance companies, a medium tank company and an assault gun company. The battalion is, therefore, a well balanced force capable of working its way well forward, possibly in front of a division to keep the division G2 and the corps G2 constantly advised on the actions of the enemy's main body, and thus provide security from surprise. But, should the enemy outpost screen be too tough and too deep for a battalion to penetrate, then the whole Armored Cavalry Regiment (light) can get through. The regiment is strong enough, and is designed and equipped to perform such a reconnaissance mission. With 51 tanks, 18 assault guns, 72 light tanks, 97 armored vehicles and eight liaison planes, the 151 officers and 2,732 men are capable of brushing aside or slugging their way through any outpost position, protected from small arms fire or shell fragments.

All reconnaissance troops should be recognized as the "fourth" combat arm, equal with infantry, artillery and armor. Its tactics are different and its mission is totally different. A reconnaissance unit of any size seeks always, if possible, to fulfill its mission without being delayed by combat. Its mission is to get through, get the information and get back as quickly as possible. To do this, it may have to engage in light combat to push aside screening forces, but unless it is fully necessary in the performance of the mission, it always avoids unnecessary combat.

Let's never forget that J. E. B. Stuart's gay but useless chase of a wagon train before and during Gettysburg cost Lee that campaign.

**The aim of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces
is to create an understanding of problems involved in**

MOBILIZATION OF TOTAL POWER

COLONEL BERNARD S. WATERMAN

At the very top of the service schools there are two sister institutions: the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. The place and purpose of the first are quite well known and understood by men in uniform, but the second seldom seems to evoke much understanding from officers of the combat arms. The idea that soldiers, sailors and airmen should study the economic support of war strikes many of them as being a bit unworldly.

In pre-World War II days this attitude was understandable and tolerable. But today officers of the services should, and most of them do, realize that war is a clash of nations, and that armies and fleets and air forces are but the cutting edges of mighty organizations that gear a whole nation, or coalition of nations, to the task of winning a military victory.

The best evidence of the importance—and the successes—of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces lies in the successes of its graduates. One of the graduates of the old Army Industrial College (predecessor to the ICAF) is now the President of the United States. Another is Chief of Staff of the Army, and a third is a former Commandant of the Marine Corps. Recent graduates of ICAF are serving on the Army General Staff, on the staff of SHAPE, commanding a regiment in Korea, serving with the Standing Group of NATO, on the JCS joint staff, and on the

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Armed Forces Special Weapons Project.

Those who direct a war today must understand total power, which includes the capability of the nation to produce the weapons, munitions, machines and supplies that will be needed. Those who plan the military strategy cannot do so intelligently or meaningfully if they cannot mesh their plans with the nation's ability to produce the goods.

Military planners, as they progress in their education in strategy, find it hard to accept the restraints imposed on their strategic enthusiasm by economic limitations. Characteristically, they tend to produce solutions which blithely disregard limitations imposed by economic and logistic burdens—both in proposals for our own strategy and in the capabilities imputed to our potential enemies.

THE Industrial College conceives its proper function to be the creation of balance in the future high commands

and staffs of the services. To do this it seeks to create an awareness of the unity of military power and economic support by educating its students in the meaning of economic strengths and weaknesses and how they affect the war potential of a nation, and the methods which must be used to convert economic potentials to military power.

The course begins with three basic study units designed to develop understanding of the fundamental sources of economic strength: Natural Resources, Manpower and Technological Progress. These studies implant the idea that the three wellsprings out of which an economy is created are raw materials, men and machines. They make the students aware of the kinds of materials needed to support an industrial civilization and of the world supply situation in the more important of these materials. They demonstrate the economic importance of man—both quantitatively and qualitatively. They illustrate the sig-



Industrial College students study production methods while on a field trip

nificance of machines and the essentiality of constant progress in the development of new and better machines.

When this basic foundation has been laid, the course turns to more direct military application of economic power. The study of Requirements shows how strategic plans are translated into demands for products of the economy. Here the student sees the progression from a grand strategy to a troop list and thence to a bill of equipment, supplies, transportation and manpower. Here he discovers the direct and immutable relationship between a plan for military operations and a demand on the economy to support that plan.

The next step is to examine the means by which the material needs of the services are obtained from the economy. This is the study of Procurement. But let me say that *this is not a course for training procurement officers*, as so many seem to think is the primary purpose of ICAF. The study of procurement is aimed at developing a broad understanding of the problems which arise when the uniformed services go into the market place with orders for large amounts of goods. The effect of these orders on the civilian economy creates problems which are of interest to both military and civilian mobilizers. The procurement study includes therefore a study of economic stabilization which shows the nature of the stresses placed on the economic structure and the kinds of action which may be taken to relieve these stresses.

FROM procurement the student at ICAF turns to Production. Here he learns something of the difficulties of conversion to the manufacture of war goods; the length of time required to produce items after the initial conception of their need; the delaying effect of changes in design; the scope of the capabilities of U.S. industry to produce the things the services want; and the problems of reconversion of industry after a war. This study develops an understanding of the limitations the industrial capabilities of a nation can put on its strategy.

The academic year comes to a climax in the study of Economic Potential and Mobilization—designed to summarize the meaning of previous studies in terms of total economic potential and the actions which must be taken to realize it. In Economic Potential, the student examines briefly the economies of the various countries of the world and analyzes the contributions which economic strengths and weaknesses

make toward the ability of nations to support a war effort.

In Mobilization, he considers the steps which must be taken to convert an economy to the support of a war effort. This study goes into the organizations which must be created and the powers which must be allocated to cause the conversion to take place and



to limit the disruption of the civilian economy.

WHAT does all this mean to the officer of the combat arms? There is ample evidence that its meaning is not as well understood as it should be. The best evidence is the still common misconception that the Industrial College of the Armed Forces is a school for technical service officers. It is true that most of the Army students have been technical service officers, but the 1952-53 class shows an increase in the proportion of officers from the combat arms. This trend should continue.

It is the function of the G1 and G4 sections of the General Staff to insure that the combat troops are properly supported. This can be accomplished effectively only if a substantial number of the officers in G1 and G4 are from the combat arms. This has long been appreciated and practiced. But these officers should also have knowledge of logistic problems and functions. It would be wholly insufficient for a combat arms officer to bring to the General Staff merely a knowledge of the logistic needs of the combat troops. To be a whole man in the job he must be able to match requirements and resources. Thus he needs what the ICAF teaches.

Higher commanders and strategic planners also need an understanding of the strictures that can be placed on military forces by economic, political and psychological conditions. They must be able to match requirements and resources.

We are experiencing forcible demonstrations of the impingement of the economy of scarcity on the task of the military leader. The utmost pressure is being applied to make the services cost-conscious and to compel commanders to apply principles of good business management. But it is not enough for a commander to know the price of a rifle, a typewriter or a pair of shoes. He must understand the basic economic facts that create those costs. He must know what kinds of economic resources may be used freely and what kinds must be used sparingly in the implementation of military strategy.

In this article I have tried to indicate the kind of knowledge the U.S. public expects of its high military men. It is clearly necessary that military leaders and planners know how to integrate strategy and economy.

A superficial awareness of the maximum dollar strain which the economic structure can bear is not enough. This maximum will seldom be large enough to carry the full strategy we might like to adopt. It therefore is essential that we men in uniform understand the relative drains on the economy caused by the production of different kinds of firepower. If we do so understand we can then make decisions that will give us the maximum chance of obtaining our strategic objectives.

Most of our past and present high military leaders have come from the combat arms. It is highly probable that the large majority of our future leaders will come from those arms. But how are we to insure that these officers will have a sufficiently broad comprehension of all the aspects of national power? The Industrial College of the Armed Forces is the answer. It can broaden their comprehension of the demands on the economy which are created by military plans.

Officers of the combat arms should not miss the opportunity to gain knowledge that is so essential to successful high command. To be eligible you must have at least 18 and not more than 25 years of service and must have credit for the Armed Forces Staff College, or be a graduate of the Army War College, the Air War College or the senior course at the Naval War College.

Today, as never before, the motto of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces points up a vital truth. The future security of this nation may depend on a clear understanding of this truth by our military leaders: "*Industria et Defensio Inseparabiles*."

A STANDARD COMBAT-IN-TOWNS COURSE

LIEUTENANT COLONEL FREDERICK WILKINS

Are you unhappy with the way we teach street fighting? Here's the solution of one officer who is.

DURING the last war we fought through clusters of grass huts, ancient walled towns and modern cities; regardless of what part of the world they were in, most of our troops had some experience in street fighting. In Korea we have had one major battle in a built-up area. Any future conflict would see large-scale fighting in towns. Obviously we cannot afford to neglect training in combat in towns.

If you accept this you have to ask: how is our training? Training, of course, has two parts: doctrine, and actual training methods and equipment. As for doctrine we are on pretty sound ground; we have decided how to fight in towns, based on past experience. Unfortunately, though, our teaching of this doctrine falls flat because of poor training methods and equipment. With a few rare exceptions the average soldier receives nothing but false impressions and bad habits when he goes through our so-called combat-in-towns course.

The average combat-in-towns course has as much resemblance to an actual town as a rural Chick Sale has to a Roman bath. Houses which are not houses are scattered along a street which could not possibly be mistaken for a street. As though this were not enough, each training site has a different "town" of different shape, size and variation. But all seem to be contesting for the best cartoon strip version of Tobacco Road.

A limited amount of firing from windows is possible in such a course; trainees get some idea of the sound of explosives going off, and they climb in and out of

a lot of splintered 2 x 4 window frames. They also get a lot of bad habits and no idea at all of supporting weapons, use of flame throwers, actual use of WP and fragmentation grenades. The single-room shacks give no feeling of the maze inside a large building. How can a soldier learn how to fight inside a multi-storyed structure unless he actually trains in a building with two or more floors?

WE have standard firing and infiltration courses; our staff work is the same everywhere in the Army (this is not an invitation for a debate). So why don't we train *all* our troops in the same combat-in-towns course? Why not set up a standard street fighting course? Despite the provisions of TC 14, we don't have such a course. The construction of this course should not be left to the whim of the individual post but should be designed so that troops receive definite instruction in all the techniques of street combat.

Here are the general specifications for such a course:

- It will be built of masonry and be realistic in appearance.
- It will provide necessary safety factors, yet permit the use of ball ammunition, rocket launchers, flame throwers, and other weapons.
- There will be a nearby area for briefing and concurrent training of troops.
- The "town" will be large enough for a platoon to fight through, thus providing some tactical training, as well as instruction in techniques.
- There will be at least two streets, so that trainees will get some idea of necessary tactical cooperation, plus the sounds of nearby battle.
- There will be at least one street crossing.
- Several of the buildings will have more than one story. The course will provide for at least one building to be cleared from the top down and another from the cellar up.
- The usual proportion of shops, dwellings, and such will be provided.
- Several of the buildings will have the usual arrangement of interior rooms, doors, hallways and closets.
- Some of the buildings will be ruined, or partially so.
- The buildings on the edge of the town

will be ruined, as is often the case; the walls of these can be used for climbing tests.

- Various barricades will be placed in the streets and inside the buildings. There will be at least one barricaded and defended cellar strongpoint.
- Targets will be of the spring type, dropping out of sight when hit. Bayonet dummies will be placed in logical surprise positions.
- Maximum realism will be provided by the use of suitable signs, street markers, ruined furniture and vehicles.


This course will cost more than our jerry-built shack towns, but upkeep and repair will be less, even using live ammunition.

The use of concrete walls will permit rifle fire through doorways or windows. The trainee can approach a doorway, shoot it clear, throw in a live grenade, then mop up the room. Concrete will enable us to have cellar strongpoints that will withstand flame throwers, rockets and recoilless rifles. There will be a lot of smoke and a lot of dust flying, but our training area won't be destroyed. A wall can be patched up quickly and cheaply when it gets too many rocket holes.

The location and some other details can be left to the limitations of terrain and the skill of the local builders, but the above requirements are a minimum. All of the work can be done by soldiers. Much of the construction can be of concrete or cinder block. Floors and roofs can be built by anyone with a minimum of carpentry skill. Concrete walls can be poured in forms and the wooden forms later used for roofing, floors, window frames and target frames.

A COURSE to satisfy these requirements is shown on page 45. The use of the course could be as follows. Trainees report to the briefing area. They can either get instruction in the doctrines of street fighting or receive a review of previous instruction. Instructors demonstrate the proper way to fire from doorways and windows, how to throw grenades inside buildings, the use of grapnel hooks and scaling ropes; two- and three-man teams show how to scale

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walls. Then the trainees examine a model of the town and go over the tactical methods used in reducing the enemy garrison. Within this area are mock-ups of windows, doors, walls and grenade targets; while one group is fighting in the town, another group can be receiving instruction or getting actual practice on individual skills. When the trainees are briefed, they move across the open ground to the edge of the town. Artillery is covering their advance, shelling the edge of the town. This is simulated by controlled explosive charges from a control tower.

Under cover of their own machine

guns and individual weapons they close on the ruined buildings at the edge of the town and take cover in the shell holes and rubble. These ruins are actually grenade courts, built in the form of walls, with windows for grenades. Rifle targets are shot down, then grenades are tossed inside the ruins. This is followed by a rush, bayoneting any dummies on the other side of the walls.

Depending on the tactical plan, machine guns and killer parties are set up to fire up the alley and rear of the houses, as well as cover the streets. The trainee teams use two- and three-man lifts to

gain the roofs of AAA, which are flat-roofed ruins. They rush the two-story structures and gain entrances through second-story windows, clearing the buildings by working to the ground floor.

The walls of CCC have been prepared for mouseholing—prepared craters, with concrete blocks that can be smashed in and replaced for the next team. Gaining entrance through the walls, the interior of CCC, a large shop, is cleared by grenades and bayonet mop-up.

It is found that the walls of DDD are too stout for breaching with the tools at hand, and it is necessary to gain an en-

trance through the street windows and doors. Using smoke grenades and covering fire the trainees rush into the street and smash into it. It is a three-room dwelling, with one of the rooms barricaded.

The street intersection is covered from cellar strongpoints of E-E-E. Direct fire weapons are used to fire the gun ports. Rocket launchers and machine guns keep the enemy down, while smoke blocks the cross street. Targets in the ruined buildings at E-1 are shot up and the buildings E-E-E rushed.

The cellars are given the grenade treatment, while the main building is cleared; then the cellar doorway is forced and the strongpoint mopped up. Once finished, entrance is forced through a passageway into F-F-F. This two story building is mopped up from the ground floor up.

At the conclusion of the exercise trainees are assembled and a critique held.

BY using various target arrangements, the course can be run time after time with new situations each time. It may be booby trapped or not booby trapped. The supporting weapons used may be more or less than the usual allotment, making allowances for reinforcement, or simulated losses.

Various other uses for this course are possible. First, since it is a street-fighting course, we can teach defensive combat. This is hardly possible in a flimsy shack, since no sane man would defend anything so easily burned. We can hold CPXs in realistic sites, using all our communication equipment as we would actually use it in the field. Aid stations and other medical installations can be established in our village, just as they would be in combat. Intelligence troops can search for documents amid realistic surroundings. Engineer and infantry troops can plant and clear mines. Scouting and patrolling problems can be held in the town. Military police units can practice traffic control amid a ruined village, or train in riot control against "mobs" of fellow soldiers.

There is no use pretending any of these supplementary uses are feasible in our present combat-in-towns courses. But the main advantage to such a standard course is the knowledge that when a man reports to your unit he knows how to fight in towns. Street fighting is over roofs and in cellars, through windows and down stairways, in the street and in alleys. That's why we need a standard course to teach these ways of combat. This course does it.

NIGHT RAID ON HILL 528

CAPTAIN BALLARD B. SMALL

This is combat: Somebody up high wanted a prisoner and for very good reasons doubtless, so the company made a carefully planned night raid that was successful, except that it didn't net a single prisoner, and the leader of the blocking platoon blocked some fire with his leg—and found himself on the way out of the war.

YOU are a rifle platoon leader in the 23d Infantry, 2d Infantry Division. It is late in the afternoon of 21 April 1952. You are in the vicinity of Kum-hwa, North Korea. You have known for several days that your company will raid a finger on Hill 528 some 2000 yards farther north. Your mission is to capture prisoners.

The plan devised by the company commander specifies three groups in the composition of the raiding force. There will be two especially organized working platoons and the company command group. The first platoon will consist of two assault squads of riflemen only, plus a third squad composed of two BAR teams. The second platoon will consist of two assault squads alone. Each of the two platoons will be commanded by the regular platoon leaders. The company commander's group will consist of one rifle squad, one 57mm recoilless rifle with crew, the 4.2-inch mortar observers, and several men for radio operation and wire laying. The remainder of the company will remain on the MLR positions.

It is planned that the operations force will proceed from the company area at approximately 2030 hours, advancing in one body for approximately 1000 yards to a point where the force will split into two groups. At this point the first platoon consisting of the two squads and the BAR squad, will continue toward the objective in a zigzag manner from the southeast, moving northwest up the nose of the hill to within 200

yards of the first enemy positions. There the BAR squad will be established as a base through which the two assaulting squads will move in parallel thrusts on up into the Chinese positions atop the finger. After reaching their objective, these squads will get into the Chinese communication trenches and try to capture the defenders.

From the break-off point, the second platoon and the CP group will bear farther northward, chogie up the side of the finger so as to arrive several hundred yards behind the strongpoint which is the first platoon's objective. Slightly down from the crest, the company command group will stop, organize a little position with the security in whatever manner the ground seems to indicate, and direct the operation. The second platoon, consisting of the two rifle squads, will continue on up the hill to the crest. It will then turn south and lie down along the single chest-deep commo trench which connects the objective outpost with the enemy rear. The idea is to isolate the objective and to catch any CCF bug-outs as they pass back through the trench.

YOU draw the blocking force job. Your phase of the operation will take the most careful approach for you must cut in behind the outermost enemy positions, arriving there by moving up the east side of the finger in such a manner as to have enemy both to the south, north and east.

The time for departure is 2030 hours and the time set for return is posted back at Regiment as UCM—upon completion of mission, which probably means all night. The routes of approach have been marked out on overlays for the benefit of the map keepers in the rear, but you know without reference to any map where the CO wants you

CAPTAIN BALLARD B. SMALL, Artillery-USAR, served in Korea in 1951-52 with the 37th Field Artillery Battalion, 2d Infantry Division, and in World War II with the 5th Armored Division in Europe. He now lives at Swarthmore, Pennsylvania and is S4, 24th AAA Group.

to go. You have looked out there all day long for weeks and already know every tree and gully. The slopes are steep and rocky. There are many trees and scattered heavy brush over most of the route, but the last four or five hundred yards is over bare and abruptly clear terrain, which is the sole enemy advantage after the explosion of hundreds of rounds of U.S. artillery fire.

Jump-off time nears; there remains only the usual interminable waiting until dark. There will be a check of personnel and equipment and later in the afternoon, a meeting of all patrol leaders, the mortar agents, and the artillery FO (who will remain on the MLR) for a final briefing. You clean your carbine, check your ammunition, pick up and lay aside in your bunker, six grenades, fragmentation. Then you spend the remainder day visiting your men, taking a reading on things, or just talking with them.


The day is soon gone and at that time of year dark has been gathering over an hour when you and the rest of the company form up at 1930 hours. You stand, sit and hunch in the trenches outside your bunkers for almost an hour before you get the word to move out. At 2032 hours it comes.

THE company commander starts the cautious descent from your hill down through the safe lane which leads

through your wire, down 220 meters to the deserted valley floor over which you watch during the days. Across the valley to the foot of the enemy hills the movement gets progressively slower until the extended file seems to wait more than it moves.

At the foot of the objective hill, the first platoon splits off and begins the cautious zigzag ascent to face the enemy from the south. Everyone is much quieter, few men whisper though often head to toe when the slope gets steep. You rationalize that you are somewhat more fortunate. Your group is the strongest and is approaching from the side. Though there will be enemy on three sides, they will not be concentrated at the point where you will block.

At 0100 hours, the enemy detects the first platoon group while it is several hundred yards short of its assault positions. Far to your left you hear the z-i-i-p, sz-i-i-p, z-i-i-p of the burp guns and the larger single concussions of grenades which burst with bright red flashes. The heavier ka-pows of the MIs overlap with the lighter enemy weapons as the fire fight builds up. Then all blend together in a steadily rising crackle. The explosions of the grenades are more frequent and you try to take advantage of the noise to move your group rapidly past the command group on up to the crest of the ridge, to your own position.



Your blocking team does not get quite on top of the ridge when you begin to hear sharp reports above and around you. You also are receiving fire from the enemy, but no grenades yet. You get on top without much trouble except the annoying noise which has a retarding effect on the head and neck. You scramble around in the intermittent flashing darkness depositing your men for front and back protection astride the narrow communication trench.

At 0105 hours the heavy mortars and the 81mm mortars fire their prearranged concentrations on the northern reaches of the objective in front of you and on the hill masses behind you in accordance with the plan to inhibit any enemy reinforcement of the outpost.

At 0115 hours the word comes over the field line to the CP group to withdraw. You begin to send your men back down the hill. No enemy has moved either way through or by the trench. During the rapid action which was less frightening than the slow approach march, the enemy used small arms only in your direction. The first platoon received grenades in addition and possibly some light mortar; you are not certain.

BRIGHT red flashes of Chinese grenades burst down the hill below you and to the right as you hurry down. These are surely landing among the other platoon as it pulls back. At least twenty rounds of heavy mortar fire falls

down the slope well behind the first platoon and you wonder why the Chinese fired there, not particularly thinking that they did not have the equal advantage of knowing the plans and routes of the friendly troops. Friendly artillery begins to clobber several points on Hill 528 and the enemy firing tapers off as it loses contact with the assaulting troops.

You get over half your men off the ridge and started down when you are surprised to find yourself knocked to the ground by a blow on the leg which felt like a hard-thrown rock. On the ground you first think in a flash that you had better be careful since you might get hurt exposing yourself. Then you feel the wetness and with a shock realize that you have been hit. When you try to move your leg you find it immobilized.

One of your men gets to you and before you know it can be done, you are on a litter at the CP location. You notice one of your sergeants is also wounded, but can walk. You remember now that someone has ripped your field jacket and fatigue jacket, saying something about "morphine," and you begin to stop worrying. The sound of firing from back up on the hill becomes intermittent.

THE company commander comes by in the darkness and says something which you recognize as friendly and not important, and then he moves away. You are picked up and borne off, jog-

ging and swaying, and bumping through the air. You wonder if the men who are carrying off as they get tired are annoyed at having to carry you home. You remind yourself to apologize. All your impressions, tripping men, cursing men carrying you, your litter, lights, faces, voices, noises . . . all blur together and you relax.

At 0200 hours the company patrol has assembled and by 0430 has closed completely into the company area. Later in the MASH, you learn that the first platoon reached its objective, actually getting into the trenches, but did not capture any prisoners. They estimated the enemy strength at approximately a platoon—stronger than was estimated before the patrol. It found the strongpoint trenches some places three meters deep with living holes opening off them.

The platoon planted a few antipersonnel mines in the trenches, set off some grenades in bunkers and left. Enemy losses could not be accurately determined. None was counted killed. Friendly losses totalled three.

Next day while waiting for word about the possibility of evacuation, one of the regimental medics comes in and passes on the grapevine word that the company commander is supposed to be recommending you for a Bronze Star, and though you wonder exactly what you did outstandingly, you feel good. There aren't any sheets on your cot and you wonder how far back you have to go to get them.



★ CEREBRATIONS ★

Our literate cocktail-hour tacticians stand to receive as much as \$10.00 for their contributions to this department. However, the price for those "dashed off" with scant consideration for the rules of composition and rhetoric will be much less. Hold them to four or five hundred words and type them double-spaced.

Let 'em Go

THAT was an interesting and instructive story the newspapers had some months ago about Corporal Kuznick, the instructor at Fort Knox, who went AWOL and hitched a ride to Korea in order to get into combat. Upon discovery, his wrists were tapped with a ten dollar fine and at his own request he was returned to the combat outfit he had joined.

But several questions come up. Had Corporal Kuznick applied for Korean duty through channels before he took matters into his own hands? If so, what happened to his application? Was he on a "stabilized" assignment? Or was he told that "no replacement is available?" Were his superiors taken in by the age-old fallacy of the "indispensable man"—and Kuznick had done his work too well? We don't know the answer to these speculative questions but we do know that there are others who want Korean assignments and can't get them because of these reasons . . . or they are told.

It has become fashionable in recent months to belittle the fighting qualities and patriotism of our American soldier. We read headlines that speak of "wholesale desertions" and there are investigations by committees, official and unofficial, and service journals carry articles on "What's Wrong with the U. S. Soldier?" But what about Corporal Kuznick? Is the Army yelling for help so loudly that it can't hear the cries of men and officers five or six echelons away?

I say that those of us who want to go to Korea should be permitted to go forthwith. Let us leave our stabilized assignments; the homesteaders will fill our places and be content. Replacements for Stateside duty and noncombat theaters can't be hard to find. Indispensable? There has been no such thing since Adam—the one indispensable man.

I do not believe that this policy of greasing the skids and let 'em go will disrupt the overall manpower plan. Kuznicks are rare and a company of them would be worth a battalion of ship jumpers and depot squatters.

What if I am wrong? What if my

policy backfired and severely offset all manpower planning? All sorts of weird things could happen. It is possible to visualize long lines of Korea-bound troops griping because a storm at sea had detained them twenty-four hours; Stateside headquarters would appear ghostly, officered by retirees called in to fill the gaps and manned by amputees; a Wac corporal would fill Kuznick's shoes, complaining bitterly that she had been denied Korea service because of her asthma. Could this happen here? If anyone thought that it could, what's all the commotion about?

CAPT. JOHN A. HUGHES, JR.
Ex-Infantry

Head Protection

Now that we are seeking better individual protective equipment, it seems to me that this is a good time to get rid of the cumbersome, inefficient, rattling helmet.

A close-fitting helmet of the same flexible material as the vest could be devised that would protect the head, back of the neck, the throat, and all of the face except that part needed to be uncovered for seeing and breathing. This front part could be left open except when needed for protection. A visor to protect from fragments and glare would be very useful and would give more protection than the helmet for both purposes.

The winter pile liner could be worn beneath the helmet. When the protective helmet was not needed it could be thrown over the back similar to the hood, M-1943.

Fine for winter, you say; but what about hot weather? I suggest a frame similar to the one used in the helmet liner, made with a "housing" of canvas, duck or other tough fabric, suitable for wear as a hat when the protective covering is not worn. This would insure the free circulation of air, both with and without the protective helmet in place, and would give protection from the elements. A good visor should be provided for the "liner" for use when the helmet is not carried or when thrown back for comfort.

This would not only simplify present equipment, but would be lighter and more comfortable, both in summer and winter. For a change in season, merely substitute pile liner for summer liner, and the soldier is not only more comfortable, he is protected.

This type of head protection could be used by all arms, even the tankers and flyers, as it fits closely about the head and gives as nearly complete protection as can be had. Moreover, it permits the use of earphones.

Civilians are said to be rushing in to buy the protective vests, so perhaps there would even be a market for helmets for duck hunters.

DUCK HUNTER

Check Your Records

It snowed in Washington one morning late this spring and so buses carrying hundreds of workers, military and civilian, to the Pentagon were late. And among them was a personnel clerk who has your future in the palm of his or her hand. For convenience, we'll call the clerk a *him*, and label him John.

Poor John rolled in sometime after 0900 hours, a full sixty minutes late and already tired from the pushing and shoving he had received on the crowded bus. He also had a slight headache from a party he had enjoyed the night before. Lots of records were piled up in his IN basket, and John contemplated them with a sinking heart. "I'll never get through this day," he thought. But he was a conscientious fellow, and dug in.

The pile of records on John's desk gradually thinned out. But his headache got worse. His eyes burned, and he found his thoughts wandering. He looked at the clock. Time for coffee, maybe? Ah, yes, 1030. But first he would finish this one record.

And that record was one pertaining to *you*.

Now, it doesn't matter what the particular record was. Perhaps John was entering a change on your Form 66-1, down in Career Management. Maybe he was in the Assignments Branch, processing the records of the latest batch of "eligibles" for overseas duty. Wherever John was, whatever he was doing, his aching head and burning eyes and his impatience to get out to the coffee bar, caused him to make an error. One vital piece of information was omitted, or entered incorrectly.

So a month from now you are suddenly ordered to the Far East (you just

returned, remember?) or you are passed over on the next promotion list (you know you are within the zone of consideration; eligible on all counts!), and you can't understand why.

On the other hand, to be fair about it, let's assume that our Pentagon clerk arrived feeling fresh and vigorous. He went through the day without making a single error. A good man, John. Can you say with complete assurance that the person in your own headquarters, who made out your last Form 66-A (a report of change, which eventually reaches John), did not feel like John of the storm when he racked it up? Are you positive that the Statement of Service, requested by (you name it), was extracted from your 66-1 correctly?

You can't be sure in any case, and you shouldn't be.

The fact is, while the majority of those who handle your records—locally and at the Department of the Army level—do so with care and conscience, there is always the chance of error. As proof I have personal knowledge of three instances during the past year, where data were entered incorrectly, or omitted. Any of these errors, undetected, could have affected the careers of good soldiers.

In one case, an officer dropped in to see his records and have a chat with the folks at Career Branch. This officer had spent a few months as platoon leader in Korea before being wounded, and several more months in a Stateside hospital. As far as Career Branch knew, however, while he had actually been panting up and down the Korean hills, he had merely been in an "Unknown hospital, Far East." For that was what his Form 66-1 showed. He had no credit for his months of combat.

This error was rectified, but months later the same officer discovered that his adjusted Form 66-1 contained a similar mistake. The first error had occurred on page four, where assignments are listed chronologically, the new one was an instance of omission on page one, where overseas duty is recorded. Duly noted were ETO service during World War II, and occupation duty in Japan; but of Korea there was no mention. "When we look through a 66-1 to see where an officer has been [in order to plan his next assignment], usually we check only that block," he was told. In other words, if the omission had not been picked up our officer would have been ripe for combat duty in Korea again.

The third instance concerned an officer on EAD who was up for promotion

in the Army Reserve. His basic branch was military intelligence, and the promotion board requested a statement of service from his headquarters. Now this officer had attended a military intelligence school during World War II, following which he was assigned to an MI officers pool to await further orders. His Form 66-1 showed this, but the person who made up the statement of service saw only the word "pool" evidently and, without checking the accompanying MOS, listed the officer as having been a *motor pool officer!* Whether this error detracted from his qualifications as a military intelligence officer is not known, but he was not promoted.

This is certainly not to say that you will invariably find your records messed up, either at the home station or at the Pentagon. You probably won't. But your future—your life, if you will—is in the hands of human beings with human failings. Mistakes can happen and do. Therefore you owe it to yourself to see that your records are current, correct and clear; both at the local level and topside. You should see your own personnel people and make sure that your personal history is correct in all details. And it will pay you in the long run to visit Washington every few years, if you possibly can. Even if your own headquarters personnel never make errors, other people can and do.

CAPT. ROBERT K. SAWYER
Infantry

Assault Under Friendly Fire

An infantry platoon that walks into and under its own artillery fires may sustain fewer casualties in taking its objective than it would if the fires lifted a hundred or even fifty yards from the objective.

This is essentially one of the points stressed by General James Van Fleet during a recent talk to the officers at The Infantry School. This is not a new idea, but to hear it reiterated by an officer of his professional stature is refreshing. What he said, however, does pose problems, serious problems, for the officers and noncoms who lead infantrymen into battle.

Imagine that you, a company or battalion commander, are briefing your junior leaders and giving them orders to attack.

"Lieutenant Jones, I want you to take your platoon in under our own artillery fire when you assault Hill 22. You'll take fewer casualties from our own stuff than from theirs, because the gooks

will stay in their holes and not shoot you off the place. Got it?

"Let's see. I'll be in my OP. Any questions? Good luck!"

Lieutenant Jones may not have any questions for you, but it's a pretty tough order to swallow. All he has to do is take his men into his own fire and get a few of them killed by it. And you will be snug in your OP. Great! Sure, the Chinese do it, but they don't place much value on human life. Half of the men in Jones' platoon are married. All of them have parents, sweethearts, close friends. All are young. None of them wants to die on a stinking hill in a country that he couldn't care less about. Especially by his own fire. It's like ordering a man to commit suicide.

Only it isn't!

Maybe you have been on the receiving end of an attack like that. Damn few people willingly stand up, even in a nice cozy foxhole, when artillery is coming in on top of them. There is something a little disturbing about the idea. Even dangerous. And even if you don't give a hoot about your life, you would rather die doing something worthwhile than to toss it away uselessly. No, it's folly even to anticipate a man's standing up until the artillery lifts. But when it does lift you can expect him to pop up and start *aiming* his rifle or machine gun at the assaulting enemy. And by aiming his shots he can kill. The man coming up the hill doesn't have the odds that he had under indirect, un-aimed artillery fire. The man on the business end of an aimed shot is dead.

We say that a platoon will go to an assault position, call for its fires to lift or shift, and then assault by fire of rifles and tanks. It's a rare man who can hit much with a rifle while walking, and the enemy knows it. When our artillery stops coming in on him he pokes his head out and picks us off like so many ducks.

I think there may be an answer, and a simple one, to both the tactical and psychological difficulties in this. It lies in the answer to this question: When you are flat on your belly or huddled up in a foxhole during a barrage, as long as an artillery round does not hurt you do you know (or care, for that matter) whether it was fragmentation or concussion? I think not.

Isn't there a place and use for a non-fragmentation artillery shell, a shell which makes the same noise and scares the same hell out of people, but which wouldn't kill anybody who wasn't al-

most on top of it when it burst? I suggest that such a shell would serve the same purpose as a standard shell *in an assault*. It would keep the enemy down where he could not aim his weapons at us. And I suggest that our soldiers would be a great deal more willing to walk into a non-killing concentration than into the more lethal kind. We might then win our wars where they have to be won—at the squad and platoon level—with far less cost in blood.

There are certain obvious bugaboos, such as over-using such a weapon. But these are details that could be overcome by common sense and judgment. Anything that will help save our lives and at the same time help us clobber the enemy should be used—even if it is as materially inconsequential as a non-fragmentation artillery shell.

MAJ. JAMES S. DOUGLAS
Infantry

Volume of Fire


THE idea that bringing a tremendous volume of fire to bear on the enemy is more likely to defeat him than fewer shots that actually hit him, is apparently not new in our Army. Captain Samuel Fiske, of the 15th Connecticut Infantry Volunteers, relating his experiences at the Battle of Chancellorsville, said:

"... The noise is deafening and confusing to the last degree. The impression gets around of a tremendous conflict going on. The trees in the vicinity suffer sorely, and the clouds a good deal. By and by the guns get heated and won't go off, and the cartridges begin to give out. . . . Meanwhile, the rebels, lying quietly a hundred yards or two in front, crouching on the ground or behind trees, answer our fire very leisurely, as they get a chance for a good aim (about one shot to our three hundred), hitting as many as we do, and waiting for the wild tornado of ammunition to pass over their heads. . . .

"... In every possible way [I] would endeavor to banish the Chinese style of fighting, with a big noise and smoke, and imitate, rather, the backwoods style of our opponents." Samuel Fiske, (Dunn Browne, pseud.), *Experiences in the Army*. Boston: 1866.

It might be remarked that the author of this extract was a clergyman who volunteered for service in the Infantry. He was in actual combat in most of the major battles fought by the Army of the Potomac until the Battle of the Wilderness, when he was killed in action. He was no theorist.

COL. C. C. CLENDENEN
Armor



This is the terrain board showing bunkers, fire direction center, two howitzer positions and positions for machine guns and bazookas. Not shown is a terrain map which portrays more of the defensive setup.

Terrain Boards Used to Teach Security and Fortification of Artillery Positions

COMBAT lessons clearly indicate a general lack of knowledge on the part of artillery officers of the minimum requirements for establishing local security and the steps for progressive development of the battery position. So the Department of Combined Arms at the Artillery School has revised its methods of teaching the subject.

Cost, maintenance, portal-to-portal time, and the manpower shortage made it impractical to use actual field installations. So to put across classroom instruction, the Department of Training Publications and Aids with the help of the Department of Combined Arms, constructed a series of lifelike and detailed terrain boards showing the various phases of artillery security and fortification.

The area was limited to two 105mm howitzer positions, the battery executive post (battery fire direction center), and a personnel bunker to shelter men operating the installations (see cut). Beyond the confines of these boards but a necessary part of this instruction are the local security antitank and anti-personnel mine fields together with the barbed wire that would be around the perimeter of the defensive area. This is graphically illustrated by an eight foot by eight foot terrain map of the entire battery position. Additional terrain boards are now under construction to portray the positioning of bazookas, machine guns, and AA as well as blown-up cross sections of an FDC, a machine gun emplacement, and an observation post.

As a supplement to the classroom aids a complete monograph is being prepared for students. It will include all of the detail and information considered essential for the artilleryman as a guide to secure and develop his position.

This revised course will probably require four hours of resident instruction and will be started this fall.

FRONT AND CENTER

ARMY FIELD FORCES

USAR Schools

AFF's new directive on USAR schools makes it possible for students to be enrolled during any phase of any course except the Command and General Staff course.

It also imposes limitations on enrollment in USAR schools by officers whose age is such that the Army may not benefit from their enrollment. These limitations, which may not be applied retroactively, provide:

For enrollment in the C&GS course

officers must be under 48 years of age; for enrollment in the advanced course they must be under 45; officers who have received actual or constructive credit for any course may not enroll for it; basic courses will be limited to company-grade officers, except in the cases of majors who may transfer from one branch to another and must qualify for a new MOS.

Mine Warfare Training

Four additional hours of training in mines and booby traps during the basic combat training period has been directed by AFF. The increase is from eight to twelve hours.

The additional time will be devoted to teaching the "functioning, arming and disarming of U.S. mines, fuses and firing devices; familiarization with allied and enemy mines and material; tactical employment of land mines to include types of minefields, setting of mine strips, marking, recording and reporting; drills for emplacement of antitank and antipersonnel mines; mine detection and breaching techniques, and familiarization with booby traps."

CBR Instruction

The 10 hours of instruction in chemical-biological-radiological subjects has been revised to make it more practical and to move it into the field of combat skills. Classes are now largely conducted outdoors and emphasis is placed on field recognition of CBR situations with protective actions rehearsed until they become nearly automatic. Academic description of CBR agents has been augmented by description of munitions in which they are placed, their appearance and action in the field, and first aid measures to be taken.

OCS and Branch Schools

Exclusive of the WAC OCS, Army officer candidate schools are expected to turn out 4,000 officers in fiscal 1954 at the rate of 1,000 each quarter. The anticipated output of each school is: Infantry School, 1,930; Artillery School, 1,070; Engineer School, 1,000.

On 1 July branch schools established a Branch Officer Basic Course for newly commissioned officers, except OCS graduates. The courses will be from eight to 15 weeks in length and will give the new officers a working knowledge of their duties and responsibilities. At the same time the regular branch company/battery officer courses and the associate branch company officer courses were limited to officers with from two to five years of service.

THE ARTILLERY SCHOOL

Target Effects Analysis

A general method for determining the effects produced by a given artillery weapon, or group of weapons, firing on a given target is under study by the Combat Development Department, TAS. The amount of ammunition necessary to produce a given damage level is a prime consideration relative to the attack of any artillery target.

The completion of this project will provide tables to assist artillery S3s in choosing, assigning, and attacking targets in a

General Bradley Takes Research Position

MANY general officers with distinguished service to our country and Army have retired since the end of the Second World War. But the passing from active duty of General of the Army Omar N. Bradley has a poignancy of its own. He was called the "GI's General," but he was also more truly a professional soldier's soldier, an officer's officer. He was the first Army Group commander in U. S. history and the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These "firsts" were important milestones in his career and the Army's history, but they were only incidents in the thirty-eight-year career of a man who was always a soldier. His statement at the time of the announcement that he was taking on a new and important defense task was in keeping with his

characteristic frank soldierliness: "The Army and the country have been very good to me, and have given me many varied opportunities to serve. . . . For these assignments, and these opportunities, I am truly grateful."

He chose this important research and development job in the same spirit:

"For many years, I have been aware of the continuing need for close coordination and cooperation between our laboratories and the armed forces. Prior to World War II, I was in charge of the weapons section of the Infantry School where I developed a keen appreciation of the importance of linking research with practical military needs. Subsequently, in North Africa, Sicily, France, and Germany—and lately in Korea—I have seen dramatic results from this teamwork—advanced weapons which provide maximum effectiveness and vital protection for our American men in action.

"Therefore, my decision went to research and industry. I have chosen to work with a precision industry, the Bulova Research and Development Laboratories, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Bulova Watch Company. It has already contributed significantly to the development of new weapons, and is capable, in my opinion, of playing an important role in the future."

In his new job General Bradley will be serving his Army. So to him we say, not "good bye," but "good luck."



more methodical, scientific manner than is possible at the present time. This will result in more intelligent expenditure of ammunition. These tables are expected to be in tabular or graphical form, giving amounts of ammunition versus expected fraction of casualties and/or other damage levels.

Instructors' Conference

The annual Artillery Instructors' Conference, 22-26 June, was attended by approximately 60 officers from other service schools, boards, and higher headquarters. This conference is held each year to present to the artillery officers serving as instructors at the service schools the latest developments in artillery matériel, tactical doctrine, and techniques. It further serves to familiarize these officers with the facilities of The Artillery School and to emphasize how these facilities can be used to assist them in the accomplishment of their mission.

Restrictive Fire Plans

Until recently TAS had been teaching the habitual use of restrictive fire plans (William, Victor, or Negat) for the suppression of artillery fires during air attacks. Recent relaxation by the USAF of the requirement for putting such plans into effect has resulted in reorientation of previous instruction. Current instruction indicates the existence of restrictive fire plans and teaches their implications and the procedures followed in their application, but emphasizes that the necessity of their routine application for all air attacks no longer exists. Two examples of instances when restrictive fire plans would be used are:

During air drops or large bombing formations in which air space may be highly saturated with aircraft and artillery shells.

When a large amount of fire is placed in a combined area; for example, a beach-head or air head during the pre-assault phase.

When normal amounts of aircraft and artillery are attacking the same targets, a requirement still exists for the artillery to shift from VT or time fire to fuze quick within 3,000 yards of the target during the actual attack run. The appropriate FSCC exercises the necessary coordination involved through the appropriate FS representatives therein.

Tactical Missions

The current edition of FM 6-101 in the hands of troops indicates the existence of three standard tactical missions for field artillery units and combinations thereof.

Studies are now under way to eliminate combination tactical missions defined in the present FM 6-101. Current thinking considers it desirable to have only three tactical missions (direct support, general

Association Affairs

THE death on 25 June of Colonel Joseph I. Greene, Secretary-General Manager of the Association of the U. S. Army and Editor of COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL, required the Executive Council of the Association to appoint an interim management so that the affairs of the Association and the JOURNAL could be continued without serious interruption.

Because of this emergency the Executive Council met on Monday evening, 29 June. In the absence of General Decker, the meeting was in charge of General John E. Hull, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, and Vice President of the Association.

The Council named Colonel Arthur Symons, Artillery-USAR, Acting Secretary-General Manager of the Association of the United States Army. Colonel Symons, who had been Colonel Greene's principal assistant since 1946, will be in full charge of the Association and publisher of the JOURNAL. Before coming to the *Infantry Journal*, Colonel Symons had been associate editor of the *Antiaircraft Journal*.

Colonel Symons appointed Mr. John B. Spore editor of the JOURNAL. He had been Colonel Greene's associate editor since 1941.

Colonel Robert F. Cocklin, Artillery-NGUS, was elected Assistant Secretary of the Association and will also serve as Colonel Symons' principal assistant.

Mr. N. J. Anthony, Colonel Greene's confidential secretary and editorial and business handyman of the Association for twenty-three years, was elected Assistant Treasurer of the Association.

Brigadier General Donald Armstrong, retired, who had been assisting Colonel Greene with the work the Association was performing for the State Department's overseas library programs, will continue with this work. The Association is fortunate to have a man of his broad experience at its disposal at this time.

The Council voted to name the Association library the "Joseph I. Greene Memorial Library." Colonel Greene took much interest in the library and over the years a number of valuable and rare military books have been added to it.

The Council authorized the President of the Association, Lieutenant General George H. Decker, to appoint a committee to recommend a permanent successor to the office of General Manager of the Association and editor of the JOURNAL.

support, and reinforcing) with definite responsibilities indicated. It is considered that modifications of these standard tactical missions can accomplish any required results better than combinations.

For example, when assigning the combination mission of GS/Reinf, it is necessary to delineate and explain to the commander the specific requirements of his mission as it applies to the current situation. Amplification of the reinforcing portion of his mission is required to cover the amount of ammunition to be expended, time of delivery of fires, and the fire planning responsibility. It is considered desirable in such an instance to assign the standard tactical mission that most closely approaches the desired mission to be assigned. Qualifications of this mission may then be made to reflect the desired effect and instructions to the commander.

Flak Suppression Fire

TAS now includes instruction in the planning and execution of flak suppression fires as an integral part of artillery fire planning. Recent combat tests have revealed that a marked decrease in aircraft losses due to ground fire results from the careful planning and delivery of artillery fire on AA positions protecting the area to be attacked and routes thereto. The planning and coordination of these flak suppression fires is a function and responsibility of the artillery element within the appropriate FSCC and is coordinated in application as to time and location with the air representative within the FSCC. Requirements for flak suppression fires may be announced by the Air Force through liaison representatives and will be considered by the artilleryman as a request for fire support to be evaluated and considered in the light of the overall fire support needs of the force and its supporting units.

Army Aviation

The Army Aviation School, recently organized at Fort Sill, anticipates 4,000 students during fiscal year 1954.

Of these, 1,650 will be striving for Army aviator's wings; 1,200 as fixed-wing pilots and 450 as cargo-helicopter pilots. The rest will be students of the Helicopter Aviation Tactics Course, Aviation Instrument Course, Aviation Instrument Examiner Course, Twin-Engine Pilot Course, Twin-Engine Mechanic Course, Helicopter Transport Mechanic Course, Helicopter Mechanic Transition Course, Aircraft Maintenance Officer Course, and the Airframe Mechanic Course.

Extension Courses

At the end of May, 7,009 students were active in the extension course program administered by TAS. This includes 1,609 USAR personnel and 3,997 National

Guardsmen not on active duty and 1,403 members of the service on active duty.

The Artillery School has recently placed in administration the following additional extension course subcourses:

40-17, Self-Propelled Artillery, consisting of 4 lessons and an examination for which 14 credit hours are given.

40-22AAA, AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion, consisting of 6 lessons and an examination for which 20 credit hours are given.

50-6AAA, AAA Brigade and Group, consisting of 4 lessons and an examination for which 14 credit hours are given.

Soviet Field Artillery

Recently published Special Text 6-154 gives an explanation of Soviet field artillery weapons, ammunition, organization, tactics, and techniques.

Weapons from the light 76mm gun to the super-heavy 305mm howitzer are described; many excellent illustrations of their guns, mortars, and rocket launchers, together with a weapons characteristics table, are included.

Soviet artillery organization is covered from battalion through artillery division. The special text then shows how these units are organized for combat and explains their normal tactical missions. Their principles of employment, to include tactical disposition, control, observation, and communication, are described in some detail.

The final portion of the text is on Soviet gunnery techniques; it covers the personnel and methods involved in the conduct, control, and direction of fire.

THE INFANTRY SCHOOL

Instructors' Conference

The Infantry School held a five-day Infantry Instructors' Conference in June for Infantry instructors now assigned to various service schools. The 76 officers, ranking from first lieutenant to colonel, toured The Infantry School's training facilities, and received orientations and instructional material from the airborne, automotive, tactics, communication, ranger and staff departments.

The annual Infantry Instructors' Conference is designed to standardize infantry training, technique and doctrine at all Army service schools as well as provide a means for solving mutual instructional problems. The conference gives TIS an opportunity to present new trends and developments in equipment and doctrine to include lessons learned and verified in Korea.

Officer Advanced Course

A revised Infantry Officer Advanced Course with a capacity of 210 students starts on 8 September. The course, former-

REUNIONS

1st Armored Division. 28-30 August. Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D. C. For details write: 1st Armored Division Assoc., 1529 18th St., N.W., Wash., D. C.

4th (Ivy) Division. 27-30 August. Philadelphia, Bellevue-Stratford Hotel. For details write: Silvio D'Anella, National President, 752 So. 8th St., Philadelphia.

24th Infantry Division. St. Louis. 14-16 August. For details write: J. Peyton, 131 N. Culver St., Baltimore.

25th Infantry Division. 7-9 August. Statler Hotel, Washington, D. C. For details write: 25th Infantry Division, Box 101, Arlington 1, Va.

27th Division. 9-10 October. Syracuse, N. Y. World Wars I and II. For details write: National Headquarters, 27th Div. Assoc., Box 1403, Albany, N. Y.

30th Infantry Division. 20-22 August. Raleigh, N. C. For details write: CWO James B. Liles, P.O. Box 791, Raleigh, N. C.

36th Division. 5-6 September. Gunter Hotel, San Antonio, Tex. For details write: 36th Division Assoc., Box 5068, West Austin Station, Austin 31, Tex.

37th Division. 5-7 Sept. Mayflower Hotel, Akron, Ohio. For details write: 37th Div. Headquarters, 21 West Broad Street, 1101 Wyandotte Building, Columbus 15, Ohio.

41st Infantry Division. 15-16 August. Olympian Hotel, Olympia, Wash. For details write: Box 96, Burien, Wash.

55th Infantry Division. Washington, D. C. 14-16 August. For details write: John D. McBurney, 5822 E. 14th St., Kansas City, Mo.

83rd Infantry Division. Hotel Hollenden, Cleveland. 20-22 August. For details write: Headquarters, 83d Inf. Div. Assoc., 1435 Clark Street, Pittsburgh 21.

104th Infantry Division. 5-7 September. Cleveland, O. For details write: Mr. Kristofik, National Timberwolf Assoc., 513 E. Columbus St., Columbus 6, O.

ly nine months in length, has been cut to six months.

The Infantry Officer Advanced Course is the highest level class conducted at The Infantry School and is now offered twice a year. The second class begins 11 January 1954.

The course is designed to produce battalion commanders, regimental staff officers and regimental commanders who can perform these duties with appropriate on-the-job training. It provides the student with advanced training necessary to thoroughly ground him in the duties and responsibilities of field grade Infantry officers.

Prerequisites for the course:

(1) Must be a commissioned officer of the Regular Army or commissioned officer active in a Reserve component whose assignment, actual or anticipated, is to train and/or command infantry units.

(2) Must have a minimum of five years but not more than twelve years of commissioned service (including only promotion list service for RA officers).

(3) Must have credit for Infantry Company Officers Course (regular or associate).

(4) Security clearance to include Secret.

Third Dimension

TIS is employing 3-D in its instruction. The Tank Weapons Committee of The School's Weapons Department is now instructing infantry students in the use of range finders, the primary sight of the M47 tank, with a stereo projector that utilizes polarized light. The 3-D projector, with color terrain slides, gives the effect of picture depth. A sight reticle, superimposed on the screen, gives the student using polarized viewers the full effect of sitting in the tank and viewing the terrain through the gun sight.

Television at TIS

The Infantry School will study the feasibility of using television for instructional purposes when a Signal Corps mobile TV unit arrives on 31 August. The purpose of the study will be to determine the value of television as a training medium and to develop the methods and techniques for its employment in mass instruction at The Infantry School.

Summer Training

More than 4,500 Infantry ROTC cadets, National Guardsmen and Army Reservists, both officers and enlisted men, are expected to train at Fort Benning this summer. Activities to be conducted under guidance of The Infantry Center include the Infantry ROTC Summer Camp, the Infantry, Quartermaster, Chaplains, and Judge Advocates army area schools. In addition, National Guard units of Georgia Military District will conduct numerous periods of week-end training.

Irons in the Fire



Patton Tank Snubber

A technician of Chrysler Corporation's Ordnance Development Department drives home the pin connecting one of the big constant-friction snubbers originally designed by Chrysler engineers for use on railway trucks and now adopted for use in the new



Patton 48 tank. The new snubbers give much longer life and better performance in tank service than the hydraulic shock absorbers they replace.

Maintenance Shelters

A portable and extremely lightweight maintenance shelter for military vehicles has been developed for the Quartermaster Research and Development Division by the Evans Products Company, Plymouth, Michigan.

The new shelter, resembling a Quonset hut in shape, is 66 feet long, 21 feet wide and 15 feet high at its center. It consists of arched magnesium alloy frame sections over which is permanently fastened the canvas covering, complete with plastic skylights and portholes. The new shelter consists of five sections and each section folds down into a package 4 feet by 10 feet by 15 feet deep. Total packaged weight, including insulating blankets for use in sub-zero areas, is 4,100 pounds.

The new shelter can be moved by truck or plane from one field position to another. It is easy to put up, re-

quiring only eight men eight hours to erect. It is lightweight—only one fourth the weight of the conventional shelter, yet provides 1,258 square feet of floor area. Without its insulating blanket, the shelter weighs only 2,620 pounds.

The shelter has "buggy top" doors, hinged so they open from the bottom. When open, they can accommodate the largest Army tank. The doors can be opened or closed in one minute by one man operating a small hand pow-



ered winch built into the framework of the shelter. Because the ends of the shelter taper toward the ground, they offer less wind resistance than conventional rectangular shaped shelters. Wind tunnel tests run at the University of Michigan have proved the shelter can withstand wind velocity of 80 mph and gusts up to 100 mph, without failure.

Iron Powder Bands

A secret metal powder process developed during World War II is currently aiding the effectiveness of 90mm ammunition and saving strategic materials. Two oilite iron rotating bands, manufactured by the Chrysler Corporation, are placed around each 90mm shell and the rifling inside the gun barrel digs into them to give the projectile the spin necessary for range, accuracy and stability in flight. Originally, these bands were made of copper and gilding metal, but during World War II, Chrysler engineers in cooperation with Ordnance developed a superior iron metal powder rotating band.

The metal powder bands, like most other oilite parts, are porous and soak up lubricant which, under heat or

pressure, oozes out to oil the inside of the gun barrel.



New Props for C-119

Sporting its recently-adopted Aeroproducts propellers, a new Fairchild C-119G Flying Boxcar executes a neat single-engine peel-off in flight tests over Hagerstown, Md. Blades of the prop on the left engine have been feathered for this maneuver, part of the normal testing program for all C-119s. The new Aeroproducts propellers especially designed for transport-type aircraft, give the Flying Boxcar additional safety and higher performance in military troop and cargo operations.

Arctic Cable

All-weather, rubber-jacketed electric power cable for Arctic use has been developed by the Engineer Research and Development Laboratories at Fort Belvoir, Va.

The new cable, which also operates successfully under tropic and temperate conditions, remains flexible at temperatures as low as minus 65 degrees Fahrenheit. Unlike standard commercial cables which tend to act like springs when frozen, it can be uncoiled with no danger of snapping back. It does not become brittle at low temperatures nor as stiff as commercial cable.

The low temperature cable was made possible by the development of Arctic rubbers at ERDL in conjunction with the Synthetic Rubber Division of the Reconstruction Finance Corp. This development was begun after investigation of commercially available cables and rubbers disclosed that none fully met military requirements.

★ BOOK REVIEWS ★

VINEGAR JOE IN CHINA

STILWELL'S MISSION TO CHINA. By Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland. Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington 25, D. C. 1953. 441 Pages; Maps; Charts; Tables; Illustrated; \$5.00.

This is the first volume in *The U.S. Army in World War II* series to be devoted to the China-India-Burma theater. Its appearance is timely since, despite the current Communist peace offensive, many Americans fondly hope that the Nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek may someday invade the Chinese mainland and so recommend that we send additional military aid to Formosa. Since Chiang retains some of the same advisers who helped him waste the weapons we sent in Stilwell's time, this book should be required reading for all American policy makers.

Romanus and Sunderland are to be congratulated on their courage and judgment as well as upon their scholarship. They have cut a straight path through the jungle of legend and misrepresentation surrounding Stilwell's mission and the war in China. They have made four major contributions to an understanding of the war in its most confusing theater. First, they give a full account of the Allied defeat in Burma in 1941-42 and Stilwell's part in those operations. Secondly, they lay bare the basic causes for disagreement between Stilwell and the British commanders in India, Wavell and later Auchinleck. Thirdly, they show the reasons for conflict between Chiang, who was primarily interested in preserving the *status quo*, and Stilwell who tried hard to carry out his instructions to increase the combat effectiveness of the Chinese Army. Finally, they lay the groundwork for an understanding of why failure was to attend General Claire Chennault's promise to "knock Japan out of the war" with a small China-based Hump-fed air force.

Despite the fact that Japan surrendered in 1945 without an Allied campaign against her ground forces in China, it is important to remember that plans for the ultimate defeat of Japan envisaged such operations. In the dark days of 1942 it seemed very important to keep China in the war. Thus, in judging the actions of Stilwell and others in 1942-43, it is important to keep in mind the fact that in those days no one could foresee the course which the war in the Pacific would take from 1943-45.

Most of Stilwell's troubles in CBI stemmed from President Roosevelt's illusions about China's status as a great power and about Chiang's position as a "head of state." He insisted upon treating China as a great power and Chiang as if he were a head of state in the Western sense of the

term. He seemed to believe the Chungking-inspired legend that China had somehow fought Japan to a standstill by December 1941. All these errors in judgment contributed to the crowning error of deciding to extend military aid and Lend-Lease to China without requesting assurance in return that the Chinese armies would be reformed. Stilwell was sent to CBI charged with the task of increasing the combat effectiveness of the Chinese Army, but was denied the only bargaining power which could have made his efforts successful.

The first thing the reader must understand is that after the summer of 1941 there was very little fighting in China. The Japanese were content to hold what they had previously taken and welcomed a *de facto* truce. After their conquest of Burma, the Japanese forces in that theater adopted a similar strategy. Not until Wingate's Chindits proved that armed forces could be supported far behind enemy lines by air drops, did the Japanese high command think seriously about invading India. This live-and-let-live policy appealed to Chiang who did not want to fight but merely to pile up American supplies for the inevitable day of political reckoning after the war. The do-nothing policy of Japan was also a great comfort to Wavell and the British forces in India. They did not wish to fight in Burma either. Naturally, Stilwell became unpopular both in Chungking and New Delhi with his repeated warnings that since the United Nations would someday have to use China as a base of air operations against Japan, some fighting would have to be done in Burma in order to open a land route to China. He became unpopular with some circles in Washington as well as Chungking when he insisted that there would be no easy way to victory in the Far East and that Chinese armies would have to be fully trained and well led if they were to assist in Allied landing operations on the China coast.

The President made Stilwell head of the China end of Lend-Lease but gave him only advisory authority. Consequently, whenever the Chinese failed to get what they wanted, Stilwell was blamed for the failure. His complicated command status led him into difficulties with the maladroit General Ho Ying-chin, whose baleful influence is reported as still operating on Formosa. He was the "other" Chief of Staff to Chiang and frequently thwarted Stilwell's plans and programs. Sometimes T. V. Soong seemed to be supporting Stilwell, and even, on rare occasions, the colorful Madame Chiang. But these episodes reflected changing aspects of the internal

political situation in China and did not last long. The authors of this volume realize that Stilwell was not particularly easy to get along with in CBI. He spoke and wrote about Chinese and British leaders with a frankness that injured his program and himself. General Marshall was probably right in saying after the war that Stilwell was right about nearly everything he proposed during his tour in CBI but he was lacking in tact and too outspoken for his own good.

The Stilwell-Chennault controversy represents the classic difference of approach to strategic problems taken by a hard-bitten infantryman who knew something about the limitations of air power, and an aviation enthusiast who believed that his planes could not only "defeat Japan" but could also pin down her ground forces in China. This controversy also illustrates the fateful appeal that glib promises of easy victory have for statesmen who do not understand military realities. Both Chiang and Roosevelt were impressed by the assurances offered by Chennault.

In retrospect it is hard to imagine how any responsible leader could accept these promises. Chennault proposed in 1942 "to defeat Japan" if he were provided with 105 fighter planes, 30 medium and 12 heavy bombers. When pressed to explain how this mighty deed could be accomplished with so small a force, Chennault held forth on the aircraft warning net he had developed in China. By drawing the Japanese 3d Air Division into combat within this net, he proposed to destroy it. Once the Japanese air force in China was broken, Chennault's bombers could go after coastal shipping and finally Japanese industry. Because he misunderstood Japanese intentions and capabilities in 1942-43, he felt that Chiang's unreformed armies could stop the Japanese if they tried to overrun his advance air fields.

Stilwell believed none of this. He was certain that as soon as Chennault increased his air operations in China the Japanese would do the same. If Chennault really hurt the Japanese, Stilwell was sure that the Japanese would take his air fields from him. He did not believe that Chiang's pathetic armies could stop the Japanese if they were determined to destroy Chennault's bases. Unfortunately Stilwell, who could write the most colorful and caustic comments in his diary and notebooks, failed to get these convictions across to President Roosevelt in a conference arranged by Marshall and Stimson. Had Stilwell been a clever intriguer instead of a straight-shooting infantryman, he might have tripped Chennault up at an early stage by gently calling attention to the ab-

sence of dependable logistics arrangements east of Kunming to support Chennault's intended operations. Instead, Stilwell merely restated his conviction that Chennault's plan would not work. Roosevelt thought it would and overruled Marshall and Stimson on this point.

By August of 1943 Stilwell concluded that his mission in China had failed and there was nothing more he could achieve in Chungking. His repeated requests for bargaining power over military supplies had been turned down. The President had forced the creation of the Fourteenth Air Force under Chennault and had given him authority to communicate directly with the White House without reference to Stilwell.

The only bright spot on the horizon was the progress being made by the Chinese divisions training at Ramgarh under American instructors. When the British and Chiang continued to hold back from an offensive in Burma all that remained for Stilwell was to lead the Ramgarh-trained Chinese divisions back through northern Burma to a junction on the old Burma Road. While Stilwell was doing this in the spring of 1944, Chennault was about to see his ambitious air plan nullified by the capture of his forward bases in China.

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek paid the full price for his refusal to follow Stilwell's advice to reform his armies while that was still possible. The armed forces with which the Generalissimo tried to secure his political position in China after the war melted away. Unfortunately the American taxpayer also paid the full price for Roosevelt's decision to give arms to the nationalist regime without asking any assurance as to how they would be used in return. As General David Barr and others have pointed out, most of these weapons ultimately ended up in communist hands. We have had to recapture or destroy a great many of them in Korea.

This is an important book and should be widely read.—H. A. DE WEERD

SOVIET PERSONS AND PEOPLES

THE SHADOW OF POWER. By Chingis Guirey. The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 315 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; \$4.00.

The publishers sum this book up as "a first-hand narrative account of daily experiences with Soviet individuals by an American who, speaking Russian fluently, served as Liaison Officer in the United States Army in Austria from 1945 to 1947, together with his illuminating conclusions about the Soviet mentality."

This, as far as it goes, is a completely accurate statement. The almost shocking thing to the American military reader is that it is perhaps more of a narrative account of daily experiences with Americans and includes some far from satisfying conclusions, by implication at least, about the mentality, education, morals and ethics of officers of the United States Army. The picture of swearing, drunken junior of-

ficers at Fort Benning is likely to remain with some American readers longer than the observations on Soviet mentality. One American lieutenant is quoted at considerable length on how he came back to the Army after a few months as a civilian, deserting his wife and child "after being drunk two or three days." "I've got," he says, "a mind just like mah feet; it likes to rove. I never had a real good eddication, but I reckon I can do near jest as well as most college men on some of these hyar tests we have here. The trouble with me is mah English . . ." If he and some of his companions are accurately described, the major trouble would seem to be more with the Army's standards in character requirements than with matters of grammar.

The author's detachment from the American viewpoint is not surprising if his background is considered. Although he is a product of Hotchkiss, Yale, and Stanford University, he was born in Istanbul of Circassian parents. His father, known to many older Army officers as one of the founders of the Boots and Saddles Riding School in New York City, commanded, as a colonel, a cavalry brigade against the Bolsheviks during the Russian revolution. Captain Guirey is a Moslem. He served as a U. S. officer in the 11th Armored Division and as Chief of the Russian Liaison Section of United States Forces in Austria. He attended the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers.

The value of this book to the American military reader stems from Captain Guirey's intimate knowledge of the Russian mentality, character and language. A point that he emphasizes is that the U.S.S.R. is not a Russian nation: "To misuse this terminology is to play into the hands of the Kremlin. There are a Muscovite people, a Tatar people, a Ukrainian people and language, but Russia is a metaphysical concept propagated by Muscovites to coalesce the many national strains in the Eurasian land mass in a drive for power."

He also clarifies some terms often misused: "Byelo (meaning White) Russian is an ethnic term referring to a Slavic people who comprise some three per cent of the population of the U.S.S.R. Reds or Bolsheviks are those who fought and defeated the Whites in the civil war which followed the fall of the czarist government in 1917. Among these Whites, as among the Reds, were representatives of every nationality in the present Soviet Union and from other countries which rose with the Revolution, such as Finland, which was formerly under Muscovite rule, Poland, the Baltic countries and the people of the Caucasus. Some of the defeated Whites fled to Europe, Asia, and the Americas, where erroneously they were often called White Russians, as if they were a race apart. They were White Emigrés, and politically they were the opposite of the

Walter Goerlitz's

HISTORY OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF



is the only *complete and comprehensive history* of what was once the most precise and powerful, the most technically competent and superbly organized director of military policies known to the Western world. This is the story of German generalship from 1657 to 1945, told with amazing, hardly known details in its proper economic, political and social setting. Most important for the professional reader is probably the story of the evolution of the modern General Staff and general staff methods, the development of total warfare with its economic and psychological aspects, and the story of the Second World War (over one half of the book deals with the inside story of German strategy in the West and the extremely detailed account of German operations against the Russians).

As Walter Millis states in his thoughtful introduction: "Its ultimate failure, like its early success, is a subject peculiarly worthy of study, now that we stand in an even more perilously militarized age, making even more imperious demands upon us to find answers for the basic problems of military command and military policy in a free society."

" . . . this illumination of history so usefully and . . . brilliantly focused by Mr. Goerlitz . . . should be required reading in Washington, where the actions of some men in Government sometimes tend to support Hegel's gloomy cynicism that 'people and governments have never learned anything from history, or acted on principles deduced from it.'"

Hanson Baldwin in the *New York Times*

" . . . the finest book ever written on the rise and fall of the German general staff." Houston Post

" . . . probably the greatest compendium of its kind, designed primarily for the student of military history . . ." John H. Thompson in the *Chicago Tribune*

" . . . a very readable, factual and perceptive, always illuminating . . . brilliant narrative . . . important contribution to military and European history, filled with material of great interest to students of sociology and biography, and enjoyable and profitable reading . . ." The Commonwealth



Reds, but ethnically they included Muscovites, Tatars, Ukrainians and a host of other kinds of people as different from one another as Chinamen and Greeks. The word *Russia*, then as now, was an invention of the Muscovite through which Moscow hoped to weld together all the nations of Eurasia under Muscovite hegemony."

Captain Guirey's book is, of course, written for the general public rather than for the military reader, but it is regrettable from the military point of view that his comments on Russian troops do not seem to have been as perceptive as those on civilians and on non-military features of Soviet life. He does make some points, not always supported by some of his experiences, about morale and discipline: "There was something consistent about these regular Soviet Army faces, seen for the first time in their own atmosphere. . . . They were all warriors; they were soldiers first and foremost, and proud of the fact. I doubt if they felt any apologetic reservations about killing. They looked happy, and their morale was good. Their relations with their enlisted men were free and easy, but disciplined as well."

Retirement privileges seem to be much more of an inducement to long service than in our Army. Captain Guirey tells of an officer just promoted to colonel after twenty-eight years' service who expected to be retired in a few months. He would automatically be upped a grade to brigadier general, get ninety per cent of a brigadier general's pay plus a house in the country with a garden. The pay basis or the quality of the real estate is not specified, but the author is definite about another privilege: "He (the brigadier) would have the right to wear his army officer's uniform with plain gold epaulets and would get his uniforms free."

The book is almost entirely free from humor, so much so that the author's comment on the expressed opinion of a Soviet colonel on the subject of one of our division commanders may be simply a statement of fact. The colonel called the American general "a good simple uncle, a good peasant."

Captain Guirey comments: "Our general's reaction was noncommittal."—MAJ. GEN. H. W. BLAKELEY, Retired.

ROMMEL ON ROMMEL

THE ROMMEL PAPERS. Edited by B. H. Liddell Hart. Harcourt, Brace & Co. 545 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Index; \$6.00.

The publisher's blurb says "this is the definitive military history of Rommel's campaigns . . ." It is not. No commander, especially one who has not had access to his enemy's documents, is prepared to write the definitive history of any campaign, and most certainly not his own.

The Rommel Papers is, however, a tremendously vital book and one that illuminates both the man and his enormously skillful conduct of his campaigns in a way

we have not seen before, even in Brigadier Desmond Young's excellent biography. These are Rommel's notes largely as he wrote them or dictated them in the field, together with his letters to his wife. Where there are major gaps in the Africa narrative, they have been filled in by General Fritz Bayerlein, then Chief of Staff of the Afrika Korps; and Manfred Rommel, the Marshal's son, who has contributed a chapter on his father's death. Captain Liddell Hart has, of course, provided invaluable comment and added in the form of notes information that was not available to Rommel at the time he was writing.

The main facts of the battles in the Western Desert we already know. The valuable thing that Rommel has given us here is the commander's intention—his reasons for the actions he took at various times. These are almost impossible to know unless the commander sets them down as Rommel has done, and to that extent this book adds greatly to our knowledge of the battles that Rommel commanded.

But more important is the insight Rommel gives into his own character and into his methods of command. Not that we can imitate them, for Rommel, like most great leaders, was unique, but there is certainly much to be learned from them. Rommel violated quite deliberately a good many of the basic rules for commanders. He was a driving leader and a gambler. He took risks that many more orthodox men would have been appalled to call "calculated" risks. But they were calculated risks, often taken with remarkable knowledge of the enemy's strength and the enemy commander's weakness. Rommel seems to have understood the British commanders in the Western Desert almost better than they understood themselves. Often, too, Rommel undertook his operations with a fine contempt for normal standards of personnel and ordnance resupply, and brought them off by demanding—and getting—better performance from his troops than either he or his enemy had any right to expect.

Rommel had an almost incredible sense of time and timing, and an acute appreciation of the value of surprise. His sense of what was possible was also highly developed, although his ideas of what was possible logically and what the quartermaster thought to be possible were usually poles apart. This sometimes led Rommel into untenable positions and unjustified risks and, we suspect, it also led his superiors and his Italian allies into promising him supplies they knew they could not deliver, just to get him off their backs.

It is interesting to note Rommel's development from the technically brilliant, immature division commander of 1939 to the man who could see, by 1942, the eventual end that the German reverses in Africa and Russia were leading to, and to the Rommel of 1944 whose work toward throwing the Normandy invasion back into

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Off-Duty Reading

J. CAESAR, SIR WINSTON, AND U. S. 40

AUTHORS come and go, but Julius Caesar goes on forever. Those of you who have struggled with "All Gaul is divided into three parts" in the original Latin will rejoice in a new translation of Caesar's *War Commentaries* by John Warrington (Everyman's Library, \$1.65). The translation is superb, Warrington having caught the movement and vigor both of Caesar's campaigns and of his writing and put them into modern English. Caesar is permitted to speak in the first person rather than in the formal third person in which he wrote. Map locations are given their modern names, with the ancient names in a footnote, and units of money, weights and measures are given in their modern English equivalents.

WE recommend to those who have reason to delve into American history, whether for themselves or their school-age children, *The Encyclopedia of American History*, edited by Richard B. Morris (Harper, \$6.00). All of the facts, dates and places of history are here so that you can find them easily, and there are excellent brief commentaries on the main events and figures of history from the beginning of American history. This is the best single reference book on the subject in print today and is an excellent place to start if you plan to dig deeper into a special phase of history.

LEON Uris' new novel, *Battle Cry* (Putnam, \$3.75), is already well up on the best-seller lists, and deserves to be there. It is a novel about a Marine squad in World War II, and follows the men in the squad from the time they left boot camp to the last battle (for the original men) on Saipan. Uris has caught very well the essential spirit of the Marine Corps, or for that matter of any good fighting outfit, and caught it better than other World War II novelists seem to have done. We've read enough and more than enough about the bad side of military service. Here's the good side—the building of a unit and the comradeship that men will die for if they must. As a literary effort *Battle Cry* isn't the best novel to come out of World War II, but it is more authentic in its treatment of war—the boredom as well as battle—than any other we've read.

VIRGINIA Cowles' biography of Sir Winston Churchill (Harper, \$5.00) is the first serious work on his full career that has been attempted. Certainly it is not definitive; it will be many years before Sir Winston's impact on world events will be fully evaluated. But it is a sound and valuable book. The author is often critical of her subject, especially in his conduct of domestic affairs, and maintains her sense of perspective in the face of a subject so complex as to drive a biographer mad. We've found Sir Winston an endlessly fascinating subject, and Miss Cowles' book is a major contribution to the growing body of material about him.

WE commend to the domestic traveler George Stewart's *U. S. 40* (Houghton Mifflin, \$5.00), a running, illustrated commentary on a great cross-country highway, a road that in various forms has been closely associated with many of the great events in our history, beginning with the days before the American Revolution. George Stewart, the *Storm and Fire* man, has a way of bringing inanimate things vividly to life and this book is no exception.

—O. C. S.

the sea was motivated by the hope that it might give himself and other leaders a talking point toward concluding a separate peace. Rommel was a master tactician from beginning to end and, when he had time for reflection, a surprisingly able strategist. He was, as his critics have always said, mercurial in temperament, but these pendulum swings from optimism to pessimism seem not to have affected his military judgment in that they impelled him to undue rashness or caution.

Whether, as Captain Liddell Hart seems to think he is, Rommel is entitled to be ranked with the "Great Captains" is an argument that could go on endlessly. Certainly he had many of the necessary qualifications—driving leadership and incredible personal energy, great tactical ability, a delicate and almost intuitive sense of timing, and sharp reasoning power that seemed to become greater in moments of crisis. In matters of logistics, he was weak, but not so weak as his critics would have us believe or he would not have accomplished so much in Africa with so little. In matters of strategy, who can say? On paper, and in retrospect, his strategic ideas look better than those of his superiors, but he had no chance to put them into operation. His concepts of mobile warfare will be with us for years to come and in that sense at least his place in history is secure, for he was the very apostle of mobility. Whether or not his beloved tanks survive the onslaught of the age of superweapons is questionable, but his concepts of mobility will be with us for a long time to come.

Captain Liddell Hart has done a superb job of assembling Rommel's material into coherent (in space and time) form, and the story of how it was done is most interesting. J. F. Trotter's maps are a great help in following the fluid action that was especially characteristic of the African battles.—O.C.S.

BOOKS RECEIVED

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THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Volume 6, May 1781 to March 1784. Edited by Julian P. Boyd. Princeton University Press. 686 Pages; Illustrated; \$10.00.

VALIANT OCCASIONS. By J. E. MacDonnell. The Macmillan Company. 262 Pages; \$3.00. Stirring stories of British naval actions in World War II.

THE MAN FROM MAIN STREET. Edited by Harry E. Maule and Melville H. Cane. Random House. 371 Pages; Index; \$3.75. A Sinclair Lewis reader.

MAN'S SEARCH FOR HIMSELF. By Rollo May. W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 281 Pages; Index; \$3.50.

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